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STEMMING THE TIDE: UNIFORMI1Y IN ADMIRAL1Y
COMMANDS NO RECOVERY FOR RECREATIONAL VESSEL
LOSSES UNDER A MARINE PRODUCTS LIABILI1Y THEORY
IN MARYLAND COURTS DUE TO THE ECONOMIC LOSS
RULE OF EAST RIVER STEAMSHIP CORP. v. TRANSAMERlCA
DELAVAL, INC.
I. INTRODUCTION

The Chesapeake Bay and Maryland's nearby seacoast provide
marvelous recreational opportunities for avid sailors regardless of
whether wind or engine power propels their boats. However, an exhilarating day on the water can become dangerous if the vessel or
its equipment is defective. During 1996, 197 boating accidents I reportedly2 occurred on Maryland's territorial waters. 3 These accidents
1.

2.

3.

See See U.S. Dep't of Transp., U.S. Coa~t Guard, Boating Statistics-1996 at 26
(1996).
See id. at 7. The operator of a recreational vessel must file a Boat.ing Accident
Report if the craft is involved in an accident that results in loss of lite, personal injury requiring medical treatment beyond first aid, property damage in
excess of $500 (including the complete loss of the vessel), or the disappearance of a person from the vessel if the circumstances indicate death or injury.
Se,e 46 U.S.C. § 6101 (1994); 33 C.F.R. § 173.55 (1998). Maryland's accident-reporting requirements are virtually identical to the federal guidelines. See MD.
CoDE ANN., NAT. REs. II § 8-724(b) (Supp. 1997). Nationwide, "[t]he Coast
Guard received reports for a total of 8,026 recreational boating accident~ in
1996; the most ever reported." U.S. DEI,'T OF TRANSI'., supra note I, at 4 (Executive Summal),). Also, in 1996, the Coast Guard reported that a total of 709
fatalities, a record high of 4,442 personal injuries, and property damage of
$22,829,958 occurred during recreational vessel activities nationwide. ,y,e id. at
4,24.
Se,e MD. ('.oDE ANN., NAT. REs. II § 8-101 (g) (1-5) (1997). Under state law, Maryland territorial waters are:
Both surface and underground waters within the boundaries of the
State subject to it., jurisdiction[,] . . . [t]hat portion of the Atlantic
Ocean within the boundaries of the State[,] . . . [t]he Chesapeake
Bay and it., tributaries . . . [a] II ponds, lakes, rivers [within the
boundaries of the State] ... and [t]he floodplain of all free-flowing
waters determined by the Department of Environment.
.ld.; see al~o id. § 8-701 (r) (defining state waters for the purposes of the State
Boat Act a., "any' water within the jurisdiction of the State, [and] the marginal
sea a~jacent to the State"). Maryland ha~ not been alone in attempting to define "territorial waters." See, e.g., United States v. One Big Six Wheel, 987 F.
Supp. 169, 176-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). In On,e Big Six Whee~ the United States Dis-
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resulted in nineteen fatalities 4 and serious injuries5 to 109 persons. 6
Boating accidents can also result in a constructive total loss7 or complete loss of the vessels involved. 8 In 1996, boating accidents resulted in property damage worth $794,691 on Maryland waters
alone. 9
The United States Coast Guard attributes many boating accidents to defective recreational vessels' hulls, \0 machinery failures, or
equipment failures. II Defects in the recreational vessel's control system!2 or component parts!3 causing personal injury or damage to
property give rise to a marine products liability cause of action.!4 No
matter whether an admiralty action over a defective marine product

4.
5.
6.
7.

8.
9.
10.

11.
12.

13.

14.

trict Court for the Eastern District of New York concluded that territorial waters include " 'those waters within the international boundary line . . . or
within 3 nautical miles (3.45 statute miles) from low tide on the coastline.' "
Id. at 172 (quoting 26 C.F.R. § 43.4472-1 (1997». Yet, state attempts to define
territorial waters is of limited utility in admiralty law; only an Act of Congress
or federal court may determine questions of admiralty tort jurisdiction. See infra notes 171, 185, and 191 and accompanying text; see also Puget Sound
Power & Light Co. v. Federal Regulatory Energy Comm'n, 644 F.2d 785, 788
(9th Cir. 1981) (noting that "state law is not determinative of navigability").
See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 1, at 26.
Serious injuries are those that require medical treatment beyond first aid. See
supra note 2.
See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 1, at 26.
In the maritime context, a constructive total loss occurs when recovery of the
vessel is unlikely if sunken or destroyed, the expense of recovery of the vessel
exceeds the vessel's valuation after recovery, or the cost of repairs would exceed the value of the vessel after repairs. See 1 ALEx L. PARKS, THE LAw AND
PRACTICE OF MARINE INSURANCE AND AVERAGE 441 (1987).
See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 1, at 24.
See id. at 26.
See id. at 32. In 1996, recreational vessel hull failures were identified as a cause
in 80 accidents that resulted in nine fatalities. See id.
See id.
See Bodnar v. Hi-Lex Corp., 919 F. Supp. 1234, 1235 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (addressing a products liability claim under admiralty law for a design defect in the
throttle control system of a pleasure boat).
See O'Hara v. Bayliner, 679 N.E.2d 1049, 1050 (N.Y. 1997) (addressing a personal injury claim arising from an allegedly defectively designed cleat on a
water-ski boat).
See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866
(1986) ("The paradigmatic products-liability action is one where a product
'reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril,' distributed without reinspection, causes bodily injury." (citing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., III
N.E. 1050, 1051, 1053 (N.Y. 1916»).
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is brought in federaps or state court,16 the claim should be governed by the substantive maritime law l7-an area of law where litigants are given an ample opportunity to recover for their bodily injuries and property damages. 18
Occasionally, a dispute arises where the purportedly defective
product caused purely economic losses-without personal injury or
damage to property other than the vessel. 19 The substantive mari15.
16.
17.

18.

19.

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.C. The substantive maritime law is part of the federal, not
state, common law. See O'Hara, 679 N.E.2d at 1054. As observed by New York's
court of appeals in O'Hara, the Supreme Court has noted that:
although State courts are authorized to entertain maritime causes of
action, "the 'extent to which state law may be used to remedy maritime injuries is constrained by a so-called 'reverse-Erie' doctrine which
requires that the substantive remedies afforded by the States conform
to governing federal maritime standards."
Id. (quoting Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 223 (1972), superseded by statute as stated in Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 510 (1993); see
also Peter Thompson, State Courts and State Law: A New Force in Admiralty?, 8
U.S.F. MAR. LJ. 223, 230 (1996). But cf. Erie RR v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78
(1938) (holding that in a case in federal court sitting in diversity, the substantive law of the forum state is applicable).
The reverse-Erie doctrine is one of several approaches commonly used to
determine whether federal maritime law preempts state law. See Thompson,
supra, at 266. This doctrine effectively erases the influence of State law; as observed by one commentator: "Applying 'reverse-Erie,' state courts hearing a
maritime case are obligated to follow a federal maritime rule of decision just
as federal courts in diversity cases are obligated to apply the relevant rule of
decision of the forum state." Id. But see Green v. Industrial Helicopters, Inc.,
593 So. 2d 634, 636, 644 (La. 1992) (holding that predominately local interests
and lack of contrary applicable federal legislation mandated application of
state law instead of general maritime law).
A plaintiff may choose to bring a tort claim under the general maritime law,
rather than under state law because the availability of comparative negligence.
Compare, e.g., United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 407 (1975)
(discussing the general acceptance of comparative negligence in admiralty),
with, e.g., Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 446-58,
456 A.2d 894, 895-900 (1983) (comparing comparative and contributory negligence and refusing to disturb the well-established place of contributory negligence in Maryland law). Whereas a plaintiff may be precluded from recovery
altogether under Maryland law, the general maritime law leaves the door
open to tort recovery even for the negligent plaintiff.
See Reeder R Fox & Patrick]. Loftus, RUling the Chc;ppy Waters of East River: Economic Loss Doctrine Ten Years Later, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 260, 263-64 (1997) ("Economic loss has been defined as 'loss due to repair costs, decreased value, and
lost profits' ") (quoting East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.,
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time law forbids any recovery unless there are personal injuries or
property damage other than to the vessel itself;20 therefore, no court
may award purely economic damages for a maritime claim. 21 This
principle is known as the East River doctrine,22 named for the Supreme Court decision adding this rule to the substantive maritime
law23 or "admiralty" as it is also known. 24
This Comment will focus on the complex procedural path to
judgment25 in courts applying admiralty law and the restrictive avenues of recovery available to Maryland litigants for economic loss
claims arising out of a defective recreational vessel or its component
parts. 26 Initially, admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction and venue in

20.
21.

22.
23.

24.

25.

26.

476 U.S. 858, 870 (1986». Economic loss also includes costs of replacement,
repair, or lost profits awarded as consequential damages. See id. at 263 & n.24
(quoting Lower Lake Dock Co. v. Messinger Bearing Corp., 577 A.2d 631, 634
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990». It includes" 'damages resulting from the loss of use of
the producL' " [d. at 263 & n.25 (quoting Lucker Mfg. v. Milwaukee Steel
Foundry, 777 F. Supp. 413, 415 (E.D. Pa. 1991». In addition, "[i]t has also
been defined' as the 'diminution in value of the product because it is inferior
in quality and does not work for the general purposes for which it was manufactured and sold.' " [d. at 263-64 & n.26 (quoting Note, Manufacturer's Liability to Remote Purchasers for '']<.conomic Loss" Damages-Tort or Contmct?, 114 U. PA
L REv. 539, 541 (~966».
SPA! infra Parts V. & VI.B.
SPA! infra notes 267-320, 311-13 and accompanying text.
See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.s. 858, 871
(1986).
See 8 BENEnrcr ON ADMIRALlY § 4.02[B] & 4-14 n.32 (Steven F. Friedell ed., 7th
ed. 1998)("Without question, once the United States Supreme Court has endorsed a principle its status as established substantive maritime law is secure. ")(citing .east River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 865).
SPA! GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BlACK. JR., THE LAw Of ADMIRALlY § I-I & I
n.1 (2d ed. 1975) ("[T]he terms 'admiralty' and 'maritime law' are virtually
synonymous in [the United States] today, though the first derives from the
connection of our modem law with the system administered in a single English court, while the second makes a wider and more descriptive reference.").
In O'Hara v. Bayliner, 679 N.E.2d 1049, 1050 (N.V. 1997), the Court of Appeals
of New York observed that this admiralty case had a "complicated procedural
path" despite a "relatively straightforward" issue to resolve. O'Hara, 679
N.E.2d at 1051; S('A! also Jeffery V. Brown, Good Things Come in WeU-Defined Packages: The Simple Elegance of Travelers Indemnity Co. v. The Sam Houston, 25
STETSON L.R. 123, 123 n.2 (1995) ("At times, in fact, the complexity has been
so great that Congress has intervened in an attempt to provide simplification ... however, admiralty continues to complicate the uncomplicated.").
See infra Parts VII.A & B.
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general will be examined.27 Then specific subject-matter jurisdiction
over maritime tort claims28 and maritime contract claims29 will be
separately discussed to expose the differing jurisdictional requirements for each cause of action. 30 This Comment will then address
the limited recovery in tort for a defective marine product that does
not cause personal injury or property damage, other than to the
product itself.3) Next, this Comment will review two marine products liability cases decided with contrary results in the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland and contrast them with
treatments from courts in other jurisdictions. 32 Finally, this Comment will conclude that Maryland courts should uphold the traditional uniformity and consistency associated with admiralty law
when addressing a claim that genuinely implicates maritime
interests. 33
II. SOURCES OF ADMIRAL1Y LAW
Admiralty cases are governed by principles of maritime law
drawn from case law to form "an amalgam of traditional commonlaw rules, modifications of those rules, and newly created rules."34
Guiding the resolution of maritime claims are these rules of the
27.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See infra Parts IV.A & BA. Personal jurisdiction over the parties is required for
in personam actions in accordance with the court's rules and appropriate case
law. See 14A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 3671, at 261
nAO (1998) (citing Volkswagon de Mexico v. Germenischer Lloyd, 768 F.
Supp. 1068 (S.D.N.Y 1991». No matter whether a federal or state court hears
a claim, the requirement for personal jurisdiction is governed by the same
due process principles; however, there are differing procedural rules to consider. See id. In contrast, actions involving maritime attachment or the arrest
of a vessel are exclusively heard in rem in the federal district courts. See Continental Grain Co. v. The Barge FBlr585, 364 U.S. 19, 35-36 (1960) (Whittaker,
J., dissenting) ("From its earliest history to the present time, this Court has
consistently held that an admiralty proceeding in rem is one essentially against
the vessel itself as the debtor or offending thing, and, in such an action, the vessel
itself is impleaded as the defendant, seized, judged and sentenced."); see also
1 BENEDICT, supra note 23, § 124, at 8-15 ("The right to proceed in rem is the
distinctive remedy of the admiralty and is administered exclusively by the
United States courts exercising admiralty jurisdiction.").
See infra Part IV.B.l.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
See infra Part IV.B.3.
See infra Part V.
See infra Parts VII and VIII.A.
See infra Parts VIII.B and IX.
East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 865 (1986).
See also infra notes 100, 121.
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"general mantlme law. "35 Unlike common law,36 these rules are
drawn from ancient sea codes,37 a form of civil law38 codified by
maritime trading nations. 39
To determine whether to adopt a particular tenet of maritime
law, a court sitting in admiraltyW will often look to the underlying
35. As an admiralty term of art, "[ t] he general maritime law derives from customs,
principles and rules of international maritime commerce which developed
over many centuries." 8 BENEDICT, supra note 23, § 5.01[A][I], at 5-5. See also
infra note 121.
36. See BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 276 (6th ed. 1990) ("The 'common law' is all the
statutory and case law background of England and the American colonies
before the American revolution.") (citing People v. Rehman, 61 Cal. Rptr. 65,
85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967».
37. See WYNDHAM ANTIs BEWES, THE ROMANCE OF THE LAw MERCHANT 70-71 (1923
reprinted 1986) (collecting a translation of four articles from the Code of
Hammurabi, the most ancient shipping laws known); see also 1 BENEDICT, supra
note 23, § 2 & 1-3 n.l; THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARrnME LAw,
§ 1-2 (2d ed. 1994).
38. See BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 246 (6th ed. 1990). Civil law is defined as "[t]he
system of jurisprudence held and administered in the Roman empire, particularly as set forth in the compilation of Justinian and his successors ... [and]
denominated [as] the 'Corpus Juris Civilis,'-as distinguished from the common
law of England." fd.
39. See 1 BENEDICT, supra note 23, § 104 & 7-5 n.l ("American maritime law, like
the English maritime law, is not a branch of the common law of England."
(citing Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970»). As noted by
one commentator, "[m]aritime law in England took its [character]/and inspiration from the Civil Law." fd. & 7-5 n.2 (citing Moragne, 398 U.S. at 386-87
n.5). According to the Supreme Court:
Maritime law had always, in this country as in England, been a thing
apart from the common law. It was, to a large extent, administered
by different courts; it owed a much greater debt to the civil law; and,
from its focus on a particular subject matter, it developed general
principles law.
Moragne, 398 U.S. at 386-87 & n.5 (citation omitted).
40. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 24, at § 1-9 (explaining admiralty jurisdiction
and procedure of the courts). Originally separate prior to 1966, the procedural rules for admiralty and civil cases are now consolidated, but still permit
special handling of matters that exist only in admiralty. See id. All of the cases
heard before the consolidation of the procedural rules:
are set in the frame of the older terminology and practice. Such
cases [from 1787 until 1966] are spoken of as being "in admiralty,"
the complaint is the "libel" and so on . . . . [However,] "today's
equivalent to . . . being 'in admiralty' is . . . either a case in which
the admiralty ground is the only ground of federal jurisdiction, or a
case in which, out of more than one possible ground of such jurisdiction, the plaintiff in [the] complaint designates the admiralty
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policy reasons of the general maritime law or some historical basis
for a rule's promulgation. Perhaps more than any other substantive
area of the law, admiralty draws from historical policies concerning
trade. 41 Local, non-commercial concerns were unimportant to the
major tenets of the general maritime law as it evolved over time. 42
Whether state or federal, all courts must defer to the settled principles of the general maritime law; its historical roots43 are "over twice
the age of the common law."44

41.

42.

43.

44.

ground."
Id. (citations omitted).
See GERARD J. MANGONE. UNITED STATES ADMIRALlY LAw 1 (1997) ("From its inception . . . maritime law involved navigation and trade between diverse communities so that (judges] were driven to find principles and application that
would have common standards between people of different countries. "); see
also The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 574-75 (1874). The Lottawanna
Court held that the Constitution:
assumes that the meaning of the phrase "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" is well understood. It treats this matter as it does the cognate ones of common law and equity, when it speaks of "cases in law
and equity," or of "suits at common law," without [defining] those
terms, assuming them to be known and understood. One thing, however, is unquestionable; the Constitution must have referred to a system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole
country. It certainly could not have been the intention to place the
rules and limits of maritime law under the disposal and regulation of
the several States, as that would have defeated the uniformity and
consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the States with each
other or with foreign states.
Id. (citations omitted).
The general maritime law is more than a rule of law of the court in which it is
applied. See, e.g., Park v. United States Lines, Inc., 50 Md. App. 389, 398, 439
A.2d 10, 15 (1982). In Park, a state court action, the court of special appeals
observed that "although the plaintiffs have decided to proceed outside the admiralty of the United States District Courts, they take with them the features
peculiar to admiralty law." Id. (citing Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S.
406,408-10 (1953». Once the Supreme Court fashions a rule or Congress enacts legislation to govern maritime law disputes, it is then applied in all subsequent admiralty actions whether heard in federal or state courts. See also
supra note 23.
See Margate Shipping Co. v. M/V fA. Orgeron, 143 F.3d 976, 985 & n.11 (5th
Cir. 1998) (citing an ancient sea code as historical authority when examining
the underlying policy reasons for a salvage award).
Warren J. Marwedel, Admiralty Jurisdiction Recreational Craft Personal Injury Issues,
68 TUL L. REv. 423, 424 & n.1 (1994) (citing EDWARD E. CoHEN. ANCIENT ATHENIAN MARmME CoURTS 8 (1973».
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A. The Sea Codes

The substantive maritime law grew out of the sea codes of antiquity that now form a part of the lex merchantia-the law
merchant. 45 Existing well before English common law,46 the law
merchant was the first private, international law. 47 This ancient "dispute-settling activity . . . allowed trading people the competency to
iron out their own troubles amongst themselves. "48 The recorded
sea codes provided settlement predictability for maritime business
disputes and encouraged maritime ventures, the success of which
were far from predictable due to the perils of the sea,49 danger
from piracy,50 or war between nations. 51
45. BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 886 (6th ed. 1990) (defining law merchant as a "body
of law governing commercbl transactions which had its origin in common law
of England regulating merchants."). Although "there is some initial obscurity
as to what . . . constituted . . . the substance of the lex mercatoria, [] it may
best be defined as the law administered as between merchants in the consular
or commercial courts, some of it being substantive law and some rules of evidence and procedure." BEWES, supra note 37, at 14; see also DAVID ROWEN &
MICHAEL C. ToLLEY, COURTS OF AnMIRALlY IN COLONIAL AMERICA 7-11 (1995)
(examining Maryland's colonial era admiralty courts).
46. See GILMORE & BlACK, supra note 24, § I-I, at 1 (discussing the historical origin
of substantive maritime law).
47. See BEWES, supra note 37, at 15.
48. GILMORE & BlACK, supra note 24, § 1-3, at 5.
49. See 1 BENEDICT, supra note 23, § 6 & 1-21 to 1-27 n.l (Rules of Oleron). One
court defined perils of the sea as "those perils which are peculiar to the sea,
and which are of [such] extraordinary nature . . . or overwhelming power,
and which cannot be guarded against by the ordinary exertions of human
skill and prudence." The Giulia, 218 F. 744, 746 (2d Cir. 1914).
50. See 1 BENEDICT, supra note 23, § 6 & 1-21 to 1-27 n.l (Rules of Oleron). The
corsairs of old are not just a historical curiosity. There are more than 250 pirate attacks on merchant vessels reported each year to the International Maritime Bureau's Piracy Centre. See generally Holger Jensen, High-Seas Piracy, J. OF
COM., May 14, 1998. These attacks result in annual losses of more than $16
billion each year. See id.; see also Philippe B. Moulier, et aI., Pirates? What Pirates? A Growing Problem the Shipping Industry Would Like to Ignore, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REp., June 23, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8332249.
51. See 1 BENEDICT, supra note 23, § 6 & 1-21 to 1-27 n.l (Rules of Oleron). Opposing military forces have historically targeted merchant shipping as a strategic method of stopping lines of supply or as a measure of punishment. For instance, during the armed conflict between Britain and Argentina over the
sovereignty of the Falkland Islands, the empty, Liberian-registered oil tanker
Hercules owned by American interests was attacked without warning by Argentine military aircraft using bombs and air-to-surface rockets. See Amerada Hess
Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 423 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd,
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King Richard the Lionhearted introduced one particularly noteworthy sea code, the Rules of Oleron,52 to medieval England. 53 Portions of this sea code constitute an influential part of the current
Anglo-American general maritime law,54 law of insurance contracts,55
and law governing maritime salvage. 56 The sea codes were also the
source for a captain's command authority,57 no matter whether he
was serving as the master of a commercial vessel at sea58 or sailing

52.

53.

54.

55.
56.

57.

58.

Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
While assisting in the rescue of survivors from a sunken Argentine warship,
the tanker was attacked 600 miles offshore of Argentina and 500 miles from
the Falkland Islands by the Argentine Air Force. See Thomas M. DiBiagio. Federal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Guvemments for Violations of International Lam: Foreign
Shipping Immunity and the Alien Tort Statute After Amerada Hess Shipping COIl>v. Argentine Republic, 12 MD.J. INT'L L. & TRADE 153, 171 (1988).
The Rules of Ole ron were said to have been "promulgated, on the small island off the French west coast from which it takes it~ name, by Eleanor of Aquitaine, on her return from her spectacular course of misconduct in the Holy
Land." GILMORE & BlACK, supra note 24, § 1-3, at 7; see also MANGONE. supra
note 41, at 7-9. The Rules of Oleron strongly influenced English admiralty
law, which adopted m"any of them into the Black Book of Admiralty. See MANGONE, supra note 41, at 7-9. Moreover, the Rules of Oleron have "always been
regarded as having an especial importance for the maritime law of England,
and hence for that of the United States." GILMORE & BlACK, supra note 24, §
1-3, at 7.
See GILMORE & BlACK, supra note 24, §§ 1-3 to 14 (analyzing the historical significance of the medieval sea codes on the English legal system and the subsequent effect on colonial American courts); MANGONE, supra note 41, at 7-9.
One of the more significant contributions to the general maritime law is the
concept of general average. If cargo is jettisoned to save a sinking ship or
from other perils of the sea, the saved cargo's owners and the ship jointly
contribute to offset the loss. See 1 PARKS, supra note 7, at 34; see also GILMORE
& BlACK, supra note 24, § 1-2.
See 1 PARKS, supra note 7, at 1.
See Margate Shipping Co. v. M/V J.A. Orgeron, 143 F.3d 976, 985 & n.ll (5th
Cir. 1998) (observing that where mariners voluntarily act to save property
from a maritime peril, they may be entitled to salvage award and that this
doctrine can be found in ancient sea codes, including the Rules of Oleron).
See 1 BENEDICT, supra note 23, § 6, at 1-21 n.1 (citing a modem translation
from a French publication of the Rules of Oleron, dated 1485, entitled "The
Judgments of the Sea, of Masters, of Mariners, and Merchants, and all their
doings.").
See 46 U .S.C. § 10,101 (1) (1994) (defining master as "the individual having
command of a vessel"); see also Tile Transfer No. 12,221 F. 409, 412 (2d Cir.
1915) ("[T]here is but one maSter, who is not only navigator, but judge of
and governor over the whole [maritime] adventure."); GEORGE L. CANFIELD &
GWRGE W. DAlZELL, THE lAw OF THE SEA 39 (1926) ("The master ... has full
charge ol~ and personal responsibility for the navigation and control of the
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as skipper of a recreational vessel on the Chesapeake Bay. 59
Notwithstanding their age, the sea codes are more than historical artifact; throughout the evolution of the general maritime law in
the United States, the sea codes have provided useful guidance.60 In
1795, a federal court observed:
[F] ar from sound principles becoming obsolete, or injured
by time . . . it will be found, on careful investigation, that
the oldest sea laws we know . . . furnished the outline and
leading character of the whole ... [and] we need not hesitate to be guided by the rules and principles, established in
the maritime laws. 61
More than 200 years later, another federal court again cited the
sea codes, specifically one of the surviving Rules of Oleron governing marine salvage, as useful guidance to the resolution of Margate Shipping Co. v. M/V fA. Orgcron. 62 The master and crew of the
tanker Cherry Valley saved a space shuttle's external fuel tank from
near certain destruction when the tug and barge flotilla delivering it
were threatened by a severe tropical storm. 63 The court concluded
that the sea code was helpful historical authorityM underlying the
traditional factors 65 governing the salvage reward for saving a vessel

59.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

ship, passengers, crew and cargo.").
See CHARLES F. CHAPMAN. PILOTING. SEAMANSIDP AND SMAll BOAT HANDUNG 474
(51st ed. 1974) ("By custom and by law, the skipper of a [recreational] craft
has the sole ultimate responsibility and authority, aboard especially in emergencies.") .
See Thompson v. The Catharina, 23 F.Cas. 1028, 1031 (D.C. Pa. 1795) (using the
sea codes as a guideline to determine whether seamen were due wages).
Id. at 1030.
143 F.3d 976 (5th Cir. 1998).
See id. at 981-83.
See id. at 985 & n.ll.
See id. at 984 (discussing The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 14 (1869». The
Blackwall factors include:
1. The labor expended by the salvors in rendering the salvage service. 2. The promptitude, skill, and energy displayed in rendering the
service, and the saving the property. 3. The value of the property employed by the salvors in rendering the service, and the danger to
which such property was exposed. 4. The risk incurred by the salvors
in securing the property from the impending peril. 5. The value of
the property saved. 6. The degree of danger from which the property
was rescued.
Id. (quoting The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 14 (1869».
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in danger of foundering. 66 The federal court cited the Rules of
Oleron and noted that" [s]ince time immemorial, the mariner who
acted voluntarily to save property from peril on the high seas has
been entitled to a reward [and t]his simple rule has been an integral part of maritime commerce in the western world since the western world was civilized. "67 As a result, the court re-affirmed the importance of the sea codes to modem admiralty law, but reduced the
largest salvage award in recorded history to the tankship's owner
and crew. 68

B. Historical Rnots of American Admiralty Jurisdiction
The historical roots of American admiralty jurisdiction are
grounded in a more modem era: the American colonial age. 69 Maryland, like other colonies of Britain, had its own vice-admiralty
courts70 to hear prize cases71 and cases of maritime crimes that occurred on the sea,. including piracy72 and "instance"73 private maritime claims. 74 The Articles of Confederation created a general asso66.
67.
68.

69.

70.
71.

72.
73.
74.

See id. at 985.
Id.
See id. at 979-80. The District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana mistakenly overvalued the cost of the space shuttle's external fuel tank when it
"awarded approximately $6.4 million in salvage." !d. That award was reduced
to $4.25 million by the Margate Shipping Co. court. See id.
See William R. Casto, The Origins of Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction in an Age of Privateers, Smugglers, and Pirates, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 117, 122 (1993) ("Before
the Revolutionary War, Great Britain . . . operated imperial vice-admiralty
courts throughout the colonies."). During the American Revolution and the
Confederacy, most states had their own admiralty courts. See id. at 122-23.
Under the Articles of Confederation, the Continental Congress created the
first national court of limited admiralty jurisdiction. See id. at 123.
See OWEN & ToLLEY, supra note 45, at 46, 54 (noting that Maryland's vice-admiralty court was established in 1694).
See id. at 103 (documenting the early history of Maryland's admiralty courts).
Prize cases were disputes arising out of the capture of enemy vessels by Royal
Navy ships or licensed privateers-legally sanctioned pirates under a letter of
marque who supplemented regular naval forces in the time of war. See id. at
156. These seizures were a means of enforcing navigation laws by obtaining
lawful title to the ship and its cargo for violations. See id. at 156, 16()..(j2. The
authors include one synopsis of a prize case from 1703 where the HMS Oxford
captured a French merchant ship loaded with a cargo of sugar and brought
her to Maryland. See id. at 298-99.
See id. at 170-72 (detailing piracy cases and other maritime crimes in colonial
Maryland).
See e.g., BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 799 (6th ed. 1990). See also infra note 74.
See OWEN & ToLLEY, supra note 45, at 150-52.
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ciation among the thirteen states and devised a national
government with limited powers, including the "narrow admiralty
jurisdiction over 'the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the
high seas; and ... appeals in all cases of capture.' "75 However, the
Confederacy's national court of limited admiralty jurisdiction 76
could not adjudicate some public litigation such as prize cases or
cases of instance. 77 These cases were left to the states.?8 The political
flaws in the Articles of Confederation led to the Constitutional Con~
vention's drafting of the United States Constitution, which included
"the call for the creation of federal admiralty courts."79
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS AND FEDERALISM CONCERNS OF AMERICAN ADMIRAL1Y LAW

A. The Constitutional Mandate
The United States Constitution gave the federal courts the exclusive powel.80 to hear "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction. "81 Exercising its own power when creating the lower federal
courts, Congress "expressly reserved to state courts the power to
hear in personam admiralty and maritime cases. "82 Once again, adCasto, su/J7"fl note 69, at 128 & n.59 (quoting ART. OF CONFED. art. 9 § I
(1777».
76. .\ee id. at 122-23.
77. See OWEN & TOLLEY. supra note 45, at 123-24.
78. See Casto, supra note 69, at 127-28.
79. See id. at 129.
80. The grant of exclusive original admirdlty jurisdiction was expressly conferred
by section nine of the Judicial), Act of 1789, which is now codified as 28
U .S.C. § 1333.
81. U.S. CON~"T. art. 1II, § 2, cl. I; see Harrington Putnam, Hmo the Federal Courts
Wim! Given Admiralty jurisllictilm, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 460, 469-70 (1925) ("[T]he
Convention ... accept[ed] a uniform Federal system, a'l essential to maritime
commerce."). As noted by one of the Founders: "[C]ases of admirdlty and
maritime jurisdiction al'e 'the fifth of the enumerated classes of causes proper
f()r cogni7.ance of the National Court'!.' " /d. at 469-70 (quoting THE FEDERAL.IST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ford's ed. 1908».
'
82. Thompson, supra note 17, at 223,226 & n.15 (citing the Judiciary Act of 1789,
now codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1)(1994»; see II/sO The Hinev. Trevor, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 555 (1866). In nIP HiM, the Supreme Court explained that:
[i] t must be taken . . . as the settled law of this [C]ourt; that wherever the District Court'! of the United States have original cognizance
of admirdlty causes, by virtue of the Act of 1789, that cognizance is
exclusive, and no othel' court, state 01' national,. can exercise it, with
. the exception always of such conculTent remedy as is given by the
comlnon law.
.
/d. at 568-69. As to when admiralty jurisdiction is exclusive, it "has been intel'75.
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miralty jurisdiction was centralized in a nationwide judiciary,83 with
the reservation that some admiralty claims could be heard in state
courts. 84 Yet, even with concurrent jurisdiction, "[a] state cannot
confer [admiralty jurisdiction] on [its own] State courts. "85
Underlying the rationale to leave certain claims within the concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts may have been the lack of
national interest over private maritime claims. 86 Whether the Framers intended a distinction between private 87 and public88 maritime
litigation, such as that drawn under the Articles of Confederation,89
is open to scholarly debate. 90
B. Statutory Adjustments to the Federal System
Statutorily, Congress also saved the right to a common law remedy for all suitors. 91 The saving to suitors clause grants concurrent
jurisdiction for in personam92 actions in state courts for some admi-

83.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

90.

91.

92.

preted as making federal court admiralty jurisdiction exclusive as to actions in
rem against vessels or against other maritime property." David W. Robertson,
Admiralty and Maritime Litigation in State Court, 55 LA. L. REv. 685, 698 (1995).
In addition, " 'certain statutory actions,' including petitions for limitation of
liability, and suits against the United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act
and the Public Vessels Act" are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
federal district court sitting in admiralty. Id. at 698-99.
See Marwedel, supra note 44, at 425 ("Until a criminal case was reported in
1863, every prior Maryland district court opinion published in the federal reporters had involved the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction.") (citing United
States v. Cashiel, 25 F. Cas. 318 (D. Md. 1863».
See Casto, supra note 69, at 139-40; see also infra Part III.B.
MELVIN M. CoHEN, AnMlRALlY JURISDICTION, LAw, AND PRACTICE 1 & n.2 (1883).
See Casto, supra note 69, at 128-29.
See id. at 128.
See id.
During the Confederacy, there was:
a dichotomy between admiralty cases that directly affected the national interest and private maritime litigation that had at most an indirect impact upon the national interest. Provision was made for a
national admiralty jurisdiction over the former while the latter was
left to the exclusive powet of the individual states.
Id.
See id. at 118 ("There is no evidence . . . that the Founding Generation
thought of maritime litigation primarily in terms of private civil litigation.").
28 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(l) (1994). This statute provides in pertinent part: "The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the
States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to
suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." Id.
This section is commonly known as the saving to suitors clause.
If an action is filed in personam, the plaintiff must still establish personal ju-
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ralty claims. 93 Once brought in the state court under the saving to
suitors clause, an admiralty claim may not be removed94 to federal
court, unless federal jurisdiction could have been initially exercised
under the original jurisdiction statutes. 95 This is despite the apparrisdiction over the defendants. See supra note 93. In federal court, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) governs service of process beyond the reach of
the federal court's jurisdiction. See FED. R CIV. PRO. 4(e).
93. To file an action in a Maryland state court that is consistent with due process
requirements, the plaintiff must be able to reach the defendant by use of the
long-arm statute and provide proper service. See MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD.
PROC. §§ 6-102, 6-103 (1995) (establishing a long-arm statute to the limit of
constitutionality); MD. R CIV. P. 2-121 to -126 (governing service of process on
defendants); see also Allen v. Allen, 105 Md. App. 359, 366-68, 659 A.2d 411,
414-15 (1995) (observing that personal jurisdiction must be established prior
to the court imposing an obligation or liability on a defendant). See also supra
note 27. Actions in rem, which are uniquely maritime claims against the vessel
itself and give rise to a maritime lien, are exclusively heard in federal courts
sitting in admiralty. See supra note 82.
94. See 14B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, § 3721, at 286-88 ("Removal is quite an
anomalous form of su~ect matter jurisdiction."). See generaUy Kenneth G. Engerrand, Removal and Remand of Admiralty Suits, 21 Tm.. MAR. LJ. 383, 384-93
(1997) (analyzing the removal statute and several admiralty applications).
95. See Lewis v. United States, 812 F. Supp. 620, 622-23 (E.D. Va. 1993); see also
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § 2-3 & 82 n.13 ("[T]he rule has developed that
admiralty saving-clause cases properly filed in state court cannot be removed
unless admiralty jurisdiction is exclusive."). Thus, state in personam claims
can remain in state court, unless original federal jurisdiction was proper
under diversity jurisdiction or the claim has a federal question element. See 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) (providing the requirements for federal question jurisdiction); id. (providing .the requirements for diversity jurisdiction).
Yet, admiralty jurisdiction itself is not a federal question for the purposes of
removal because "it would make considerable inroads into the traditionally
exercised concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts in admiralty matters-a
jurisdiction which it was the unquestioned aim of the saving clause of 1789 to
preserve." Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 372
(1959), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Miles v. Apex Marine
Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 33 (1990). Moreover, the Romero Court opined:
An infusion of general maritime jurisdiction into the federal question
grant would not occasion merely an isolated change; it would generate many new complicated problems. If jurisdiction of maritime
claims were allowed to be invoked under § 1331, it would become
necessary for courts to decide whether the action arises under federal law, and this jurisdictional decision would largely depend on
whether the governing law is state or federal. Determinations of this
nature are among the most difficult and subtle that federal courts
are called upon to make.
[d. at 375 & n.43 (citing Caldarola v. Eckert, 332 U.S. 155 (1968) (internal
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ently express command of the federal removal statute. 96
With the saving to suitors clause, Congress specifically reserved
the right of parties to access remedies under state decisional law if
the common law court is competent to give it and when the remedy
does not offend admiralty uniformity and consistency principles.97
Thus, Maryland's state courts are competent to hear in personam
maritime cases,98 at least "to the extent that distinctive admiralty
remedies are not involved and . . . not prohibited by [federal] statute."99 Even Maryland state courts must apply general maritime law

quotation marks omitted); see also Engerrand, supra note 94, at 386 (discussing
the Romero Court's rejection of general maritime jurisdiction being brought
into federal question jurisdiction).
96. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994). This statute provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the
defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place where such
action is pending.
Id.; see also SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § 2-3, at 81-82 ("Removal is a favorite
weapon of the defense in maritime cases .... [A] case is subject to removal if
it could have been brought originally in federal district court, unless forbidden by act of Congress.... ").
97. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § 2-2 & 81-82 n.2 (noting that the courts are
competent at least to the extent of "the common law . . . in all cases where
the suit is in personam") (citing Bergeron v. Quality Shipyards Inc., 765 F.
Supp. 321, 322-23 (E.D. La. 1991».
98. Maryland's appellate reports contain few recent opinions where a party exercised concurrent admiralty jurisdiction conferred by the "savings to suitors"
clause to bring maritime tort claims. See Pine St. Trading Corp. v. Farrell
Lines, Inc., 278 Md. 363, 379-80, 364 A.2d 1103, 1114 (1976) (addressing a
claim where a cargo of beet sugar was damaged by antimony dust); Standard
Wholesale Phosphate & Acid Works, Inc. v. Rukert Terminals Corp., 193 Md.
20, 24, 65 A.2d 304, 305 (1949) (concerning the injuries of a plaintiff injured
while working in a ship's hold); Park v. United States Lines, Inc., 50 Md. App.
389, 397-98, 439 A.2d 10, 15 (1982) (concerning the deaths of crane operators
where the defendants failed to suspend cargo operations during a period of
very high winds); Orient Overseas Line v. Globemaster Baltimore, Inc., 33 Md.
App. 372, 381-82, 365 A.2d 325, 334-35 (1976) (concerning damage to and partial loss of a cargo of handtools).
99. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § 1-2; accord 1 PARKS, supra note 7, at 14 ("Maritime law was never intended as an all-inclusive and definitive system. The interplay between state law and federal law has always recognized that state law
could supplement the maritime law where not otherwise inconsistent and antagonistic to its characteristic features."). See also infra note 103.
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in admiralty actions,100 a species of federal common law, 101 which is
controlling. I02 While Maryland statutory and case law may impact an
action characterized as maritime in nature,103 it does not normally
alter the application of substantive admiralty law. 104
The saving clause has burdened the state courts with the "tolerably to diabolically difficult" task of choosing and applying the
proper substantive law and remedy. lOS In Chelentis v. Luckenbach
Steamship COrp.,I06 the Supreme Court explained that the saving to
suitors clause does not "give the complaining party an election to
determine whether the defendant's liability [and the remedy] shall
be measured by common-law standards rather than those of the
maritime law."I07 Here, the plaintiff was injured aboard a merchant
100. The general maritime law is " [d]rawn from state and federal sources, the general maritime law an amalgam of traditional common-law rules, modifications
of those rules, and newly created rules." East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica
Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864-65 & n.2 (1986) (citing Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630 (1959); Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 354 U.S. 354, 373-75 (1959), superseded Uy statute as stated in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990».
101. See 19 WRIGIIT ET AL., supra note 27, § 4514, at 452. ("[A]lthough there is no
'general' federal common law, it is now recognized that in certain narrowly
defined but extremely important circumstances the federal courts may fashion
'specialized' federal common law-substantive rules of decision not expressly
authorized by either the Constitution or any Act of Congress-that supplant
state law.").
102. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 V.S. 205, 216 (1917), superseded on other
grounds Uy, 33 U.S.C. §§ 90144 (1994 & Supp. III 1997»; see also supra Parts
III.B & C.
103. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § 3-1, at 97 n.9. ("Federal courts may, and
often do, look to state statutory law and to precepts of the common law which
they 'borrow' and apply as the federal admiralty rule." (citing Petition of
Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 719-21 (2d Cir. 1964»).
104. See Orient Overseas Line v. Globemaster Baltimore, Inc., 33 Md. App. 372,
381, 365 A.2d 325, 334 (1976) (noting that state courts must apply substantive
maritime law in admiralty actions). But see Green v. Industrial Helicopters,
Inc., 593 So. 2d 634, 636 (La. 1992) (holding that predominately local interests mandated application of state law instead of substantive maritime law); see
also Thomas A. Russell & Richard J. Nikas, Recent Developments in Recreational
Boating Law, 9 U.S.F. MAR. LJ. 381, 384 (1997) ("It is increasingly common ...
for courts to apply state law to a situation that should be decided using general maritime law.").
105. David W. Robertson, The Applicability of State Law in Maritime Cases After
Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 21 TuL. MAR. LJ. 81, 83 (1996).
106. 247 U.S. 372 (1918).
107. fd. at 384.
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ship while at sea.108 Instead of pursuing the traditional remedies in
admiralty, the seafarer sued in state court and alleged negligence
against the vessel's owner.l09 The Chelentis Court held that, regardless of whether a claim is heard in a state or federal court, the
rights affected and the remedies applied are "those of the sea."11O
The Court observed that had it permitted a recovery under the
common law, "such a substitution would distinctly and definitely
change or add to the settled maritime law; and it would be destructive of the 'uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution
aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the states with each other or with foreign states.' "111
In 1995, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit confirmed the continuing vitality of the Chelentis holding in Maryland Department of Natural Resources v. Kellum. 112 In Kellum, a tug·
and barge flotilla exited Breton Bay and was heading down the Po108. See id. at 378.
109. See id. at 378-79.

110. Id. at 384. However, the United States Supreme Court again recently departed
from the traditional view of admiralty uniformity by allowing litigants to pursue remedies under state law where federal law is silent. See Yamaha Motor
Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 202-04 (1996) (addressing the punitive
damage claims-traditionally not available in admiralty--of the parents of a
young girl who had died while riding a jet ski); see also Thomas M. DiBiagio,
Fostering Uniform Substantive Law and &covery-The Demise of Punitive Damages in
Admiralty and Maritime Personal Injury and Death Claims, 25 U. BALT. L. REv. 1,
14 n.77 (1995) (noting that the lower appellate court in Calhoun v. Yamaha
Motor Corp., 40 F.3d 622, 636 (3d Cir. 1994), openly suggested that the uniformity principle had less weight than previously thought). This trend continues; according to one noted academic scholar:
Since handing down Jensen and Chelentis, the [United States] Supreme Court [as of 1996] has issued fifty-three significant decisions
in which state law ·and federal maritime law came into conflict. In
twenty-nine of those, state law triumphed over the competing claims
of federal maritime law. The other twenty-four held that federal maritime law displaced state law.
Robertson, supra note 105, at 89-90 &nn.50-53.
Ill. Chelentis, 247 U.S. at 382 (quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,
215 (1917) (quoting The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 21 (Wall.) 558,575 (1874»). See
also supra note 41 and accompanying text.
112. 51 F.3d 1220, 1226 (4th Cir. 1995). The Fourth Circuit commented that "we
find ample authority that state law may not be applied if it conflicts with, or
seeks to materially change, federal maritime law." Id. (citing Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Corp., 247 U.S. 372 (1918»; see also Samuel C. Steinbach, Recent
Decisions, The· Maryland Survey: 1994-1995, 55 MD. L. REv. 1033, 1043-44
( 1996).
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tomac River.ll3 The tow, which was owned and operated by C.G.
Willis, Inc. and commanded by Captain Kellum, was loaded with
pea gravel from the Maryland Rock Industrial Dock at Lovers Point,
and had a maximum draft of nine and a half feet.1l4 The barge ran
aground at Huggins Point onto an oyster bar owned by the State of
Maryland. 1l5 State authorities subsequently stopped the flotilla, complaining about property damage to the oyster bed. 116
The' Kellum court began its analysis by observing that navigational errors that result in property damage due to the grounding
of a vessel have traditionally been considered maritime torts, subject
to federal maritime law. ll7 Holding that the Maryland statute 1l8 imparting strict liability for the damage offended the admiralty rule of
liability, the Kellum court refused to apply state law.ll 9 The Kellum
court expressly affirmed the importance of the Chelentis uniformity
principle l20 and concluded that federal positive law, whether taken
from the general maritime law or statutory in origin,121 is clearly
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

U8.

119.

120.
121.

See Kellum, 51 F.3d at 1221.
See id. at 1221-22.
See id. at 1222.
See id.
See id. at 1223 ("The alleged injury to Maryland's oyster bar resulted from an
occurrence unique to maritime law, the stranding of a vessel. On review of
the relevant law, we find ... that damage to property caused by a stranding
in navigable waters is uniformly treated as a maritime tort.").
See MD. CODE ANN., NAT. REs. I § 4-1118.1 (1995). The statute reads in pertinent part: "[A] person may not destroy, damage, or injure any oyster bar,
reef, rock, or other area located on a natural oyster bar in the Chesapeake
Bay .... " Id.
See Kellum, 51 F.3d at 1226 (citing Chelentis, 247 U.S. at 384); see also Steinbach,
supra note 112, at 1037 ("While states retain legislative power over actions that
arise within their borders, state legislation cannot significantly alter the general admiralty law.").
See Kellum, 51 F.3d at 1226 (citing Chelentis, 247 U.S. at 384).
There are three major sources of substantive admiralty law. One such source
is the general maritime law-federal common law fashioned by judicial decisions in the federal courts sitting in admiralty in the absence of statutory guidance by Congress. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476
U.S. 858, 864 (1986) ("Absent a relevant statute, the general maritime law, as
developed by the judiciary, applies."); see also SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § 31. Another source of substantive admiralty law is the federal statutes enacted
by "Congress, exercising its constitutional powers under the Admiralty Clause
and the Commerce Clause," many of which are codified in Titles 33 and 46 of
the United States Code. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § 3-1. The third source
of admiralty law stems from international sources; "[t]he smooth operation of
the shipping industry has dictated that different nations should conform their
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supreme. 122

C. Federal Preemption in Admiralty Products Liability Claims
Given that a federal statute will preempt a contradictory state
law for an admiralty claim,123 the potential for preemption is critical
to adjudicating the marine products liability case. 124 For example, in
the realm of products liability, federal and state courts have held
that section 4306 of the Federal Safety Boating Act l25 preempts state

122.

123.

124.

125.

laws. This is usually accomplished by negotiating an international convention
on a particular topic" that is then adopted into domestic law. !d.; if. SIMON
GAULT ET AL., Marsden on Collisions at Sea 1-3 (12th ed. 1998) ("An important feature in this area of the law is that much of the relevant English statute
law is based on international conventions, which are intended to achieve a degree of uniformity between the laws of the States which are parties to those
conven tions. ") .
Congress has adopted many international standards and international conventions by treaty, some of which have been codified as or referenced in federal statutes. The most significant example of this type of incorporation is the
collision regulations, more commonly known as the "nautical rules of the
road," that are applicable to all vessels whether or not commercial in nature.
See Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 868, 676 (1982); GAULT ET AL,
supra note 121, at 1-21; see also SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § 3-1.
See generally, e.g., Charles L. Coleman, III, Federal Preemption of State ''BAP''
Laws: Repelling State Boarders in the Interests of Uniformity, 9 U.S.F. MAR. LJ. 305,
306 (1997) (observing that the supremacy of federal law flows from several
Consitutional provisions, including the Supremacy Clause, Admiralty Clause,
Commerce Clause, and Treaty Clause).
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
notwithstanding.
U.S. CoNST. art. VI, § 2. See also Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648, 615 (1953)
(noting that Erie was "irrelevant" in a collision between two recreational vessels) .
See 14A WRIGm ET AL., supra note 27, § 3671, at 261 n.40 ("State law controls
only in the absence of a federal statute, a judicially fashioned admiralty rule,
and a need for uniformity in admiralty practice." (citing Suma Fruit Int'l v.
Albany Ins. Co., 122 F.3d 34 (9th Cir. 1997»).
See 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301-11 (1994). Section 4306 of the Federal Safety Boating Act
("FSBA") details the federal preemption of state law in certain circumstances,
providing in pertinent part:
Unless permitted by the Secretary [of Transportation] under section
4305 . . . a State or a political subdivision of a State may not establish, continue in effect, or enforce a law or regulation establishing a
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law in several claims l26 for personal injuries suffered because a recreational vehicle lacked propeller guards. 127 Moreover, a general
recreational vessel or associated equipment performance or other
safety standard or imposing a requirement for associated equipment ... thai is not identical to a regulation prescribed under section 4302 of this title.
Id. § 4306.
126. See Davis v. BrunsWick Corp., 854 F. Supp. 1574 (N.D. Ga. 1993). SWimming in
a Georgia lake, the plaintiff was struck by the unguarded propeller of a boat
driven by her mother-in-law. See id. at 1576. Her action was dismissed on summary judgment because the FSBA preempted her state law design defect
claim against the manufacturer for failure to provide a propeller guard. See id.
at 1580-81. In Shields v. Outboard Marine Corp., 776 F. Supp. 1579 (M.D. Ga.
1991), the plaintiff was ejected from a recreational vessel because it struck a
submerged object; she was injured by the boat's unguarded propeller. See id.
at 1580. The plaintiff sought recovery under Florida state products liability
law, but lost on summary judgment because of the FBSA's preemption clause.
See id. at 1582. In Mowery v. Mercury Marine, Div. of Brunswick Corp., 773 F.
Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ohio 1991), an individual was seriously injured by a
powerboat's propeller while rafting on Lake Erie. See id. at 1013. The plaintiff
filed suit, alleging that the product was defective because it lacked a propeller
guard. See id. The admiralty claim seeking common law remedies was dismissed as being explicitly preempted by FSBA. See id. at 1017. But see Moore v.
BrunsWick Bowling & Billiards Corp., 889 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. 1994). In Moore, a
sWimmer injured by a recreational motorboat's unguarded propeller sued
under a theory of products liability but lost on summary judgment because
the lower court held that the FSBA preempted state law. See id. at 247. The
Texas Supreme Court reversed the lower court, concluding that there was no
express preemption l>y the FSBA, even though recognizing that four federal
courts had held that FSBA preempted state law claims. See id. at 252. This
holding was expressly rejected by Emily Moss v. Outboard Marine corp., HarrisKayot, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 183, 186 (E.D. Cal. 1996). The federal preemption
clause of the FSBA was recently before the Supreme Court; however, the
Court dismissed the petition for certiorari prior to issuing a ruling. See LeWis
v. BrunsWick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir.), cm. granted, 522 U.S. 978, cere.
dismissed, 523 U.S. 1113 (1998).
127. See Davis, 854 F. Supp. at 1576; Shields, 776 F. Supp. at 1580; Mowery, 773 F.
Supp. at 1013. See also 2 ARTHUR C. DAMAsK ET AL., INJURY CAUSATION ANALYSES:
CAsE STUDIES AND DATA SoURCES 225-26 (1993). Each year, people are seriously
injured by recreational boat outboard motor propellers. See id. However, there
is an overall lack of consumer product safety attention. See id. This is largely
because:
the potentially lethal blade, turning through the water, is not visible;
therefore there is not the usual outcry from the populace against the
lack of safety of such a device, even though it is the cause of a large
number of serious injuries. If it were visible . . . consumer product
safety attention would be more insistent.
Id. The authors recommend a propeller guard to protect persons in the water
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maritime law rule, created by federal judicial decisions, will control
a state court's determination of an admiralty products liability
claim. 128 Despite the apparently clear line that demarcates when the
substantive maritime law applies and when state law applies, this
concept has been extremely troubling for courts. 129 One court
opined: "Discerning the law in this area is far from easy; one might
tack a sailboat into a fog bank with more confidence."I30
What is clear, however, is the need for consistent results by the
courts exercising their admiralty jurisdiction. 131 Only when courts
uniformly adjudicate maritime claims will uniform principles result.
As acknowledged in Chekntis v. Luckenbach Steamship Corp.,132 the Supreme Court recognizes that the purpose of admiralty law is to foster "the maritime commerce lying at the heart of the admiralty
court's basic work."133 The Court has also recognized that the underlying federal policies in support of that purpose pertain equally
to recreational vessels, if maritime commerce is materially impacted
in some manner.134
However, state courts are eroding the substantive maritime law
by increasingly applying state law to marine products liability acfrom a risk of serious injury. See id. at 226.
128. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864
(1986); see also 14A WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 27, § 3671, at 261 n.39 ("Maritime torts apply principles of maritime negligence, not common law negligence." (citing La Esperanza de P.R., Inc. v. Perez y Cia. De Puerto Rico, Inc.,
124 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 1997»).
129. See Robertson, supra note 105, at 81 & n.3 (noting that Justice Scalia has concluded: " '[iJ t would be idle to pretend that the line separating permissible
from impermissible state regulation is readily discernible in our admiralty jurisprudence, or indeed is entirely consistent within our admiralty jurisprudence.' " (quoting American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 452
(1994»).
130. In re Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 624 (1st Cir. 1994).
131. See Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 367 (1990) ("The need for uniform rules of
maritime conduct and liability is not limited to navigation, but extends at
least to any other activities traditionally undertaken by vessels, commercial or
noncommercial."); see also Lizabeth L. Burrell, Application of State Law to Maritime Claims: Is There a Better Guide than Southern Pacific v. Jensen?, 21 TUL.
MAR. LJ. 53, 54-56 (1996) (commenting that lack of uniformity would "greatly
burden commerce if everyone involved in the maritime trades were subject to
different rules in different ports .... ").
132. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
133. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 533
(1995) (citing Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674-75 (1982».
134. See Faremost Ins. Co., 457 U.S. at 677.
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tions. 135 This inclination is apparently based on the theory that the
law to apply to recreational vessels l36 is a distinct subset of admiralty
law, which need not conform to admiralty's touchstone principle of
uniformity and consistency.137 The inconsistent results can subvert
the traditional commercial maritime interests' need for decisional
stability.138 This trend undermines admiralty's goal of uniformity, as
well as, the command of federal preemption-substantive federal
law must control in state adjudication of issues when federal maritime interests are at stake,139 even for recreational vessel cases. 140
135. See Russell & Nikas, supra note 104, at 384 (noting that it has been

136.

137.

138.

139.

140.

"incre~

ingly common . . . for [state] courts to apply [their state] law to a situation
that should be decided using general maritime law."). An excellent illustration of this trend is Green v. Industrial Helicopters, Inc., 593 So. 2d 634, 636 (La.
1992), cert. denied, 506 u.S. 819 (1992). For a discussion of this case, see infra
notes 417-27 and accompanying text. See also Moore v. Brunswick Bowling &
Billiards Corp., 889 S.W.2d 246, 252 (Tex. 1994) (noting "tension between the
concept that uniform safety regulations should be established at the federal
level and the concept that a state may nevertheless award tort damages for
unsafe products" and holding that "state law tort claims are not preempted by
the Federal Boat Safety Act"). But see Stanton v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 866
P.2d 15, 26 (Wash. 1993) ("Washington's interest in providing a [strict liability] remedy for these plaintiffs does not outweigh federal interests in maritime
uniformity."); see also Russell & Nikas, supra note 104, at 384.
See Russell & Nikas, supra note 104, at 384; see also CALIFORNIA STATE BAR Ass'N
preface to CALIFORNIA BOATING LAw (1963) (discussing the "evolution of pleasure boating law").
See Russell & Nikas, supra note 104, at 384. But see id. n.13 (citing Lewis v.
Timco, 716 F.2d 1425, 1428 (5th Cir. 1983) (explaining that maritime law is a
"conceptual body [of law] whose cardinal mark is uniformity"».
See Chel£ntis, 247 U.S. at 382 ("[1]1 would be destructive of the 'uniformity and
consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial
character affecting the intercourse of the states with each other or with foreign states,' " (citing section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789»; see also Southern
Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917), superseded on other grounds, 33
U.S.C. § 901 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (restricting the state's authority in maritime matters).
See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § 3-1, at 95 n.4 (noting that the mandate of
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) "established the principle that
federal district courts exercising diversity jurisdiction must try state-created
causes of action in accordance with state laws-not federal common law[and] thus has no application in admiralty"). See Levinson v. Dupree, 345 U.S.
648, 651 (1953) (observing that Erie was "irrelevant" in a case involving two
motorboats). See also supra note 126.
There is no distinction between a recreational vessel and a commercial vessel
at least with respect to admiralty tort jurisdiction. See Foremost Ins. Co. v.
Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 677 (1982). See also supra note 139.
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There is no distinction between consumer-recreational boating
and commercial vessel claims-" [r ] ecreational boating law does not
exist as a separate legal discipline" 141 -even though admiralty law is
historically protective of commercial maritime interests. 142 While recreational vessels in their current form are a recent invention,143 they
are still governed by traditional admiralty principles. l44 Modern admiralty law evolved from ancient concepts that govern shipping and,
for the sake of uniformity and consistency, should apply to all vessels, regardless of use. Therefore, there should be little, if any, distinction between recreational vessel and commercial vessel tort disputes in the substantive admiralty law,145 including claims grounded
in products liability. 146
141. Russell & Nikas, supra note 104, at 384. But see CAilFORNIA PLEAsURE BOATING
LAw. supra 136, at 336 (discussing the "evolution of pleasure boating law").
However, "present indications are that courts will treat pleasure craft as they
treat commercial vessels, [but] they yet may conclude, under pressure of compelling argument, that the use of pleasure craft differs so greatly from that of
commercial vessels that different rules should govern in some areas." Russell
& Nikas, supra note 104, at 347-48. The Supreme Court has thus far rejected
such a distinction. See Fumnost Ins. Co., 457 U.S. at 674-75.
142. See Foremost Ins. Co., 457 U.S. at 674-75. ("[T]he primary focus of admiralty jurisdiction is unquestionably the protection of maritime commerce. . . . [But]
[t]he federal interest in protecting maritime commerce cannot be adequately
served if admiralty jurisdiction is restricted to those individuals actually engaged in commercial maritime activity.").
143. There are increasing numbers of recreational vessels on American waterways.
See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 1, at 3. Nationwide, in 1976, there were
7,671,213 boats registered by state authorities as compared to 11,877,938 boats
numbered by 1996--an increase of 4,206,725 numbered boats over a 20-year
period. See id. at 20.
144. See 8 BENEDlcr, supra note 23, § 1.01 at 1-4 ("It is now unifonnly accepted that
claims involving pleasure boats fall within admiralty jurisdiction so long as the
established conditions for admiralty tort or contract jurisdiction are satisfied
in a particular case. "); see also Russell & Nikas, supra note 104, at 384.
145. See supra notes 199-204 and accompanying text.
146. See Karshan v. Mattituck Inlet Marina & Shipyard, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 363, 36566 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying the East River economic loss rule to a plaintiff's
products liability cause of action involving a non-commercial vessel). However,
the willingness of courts to apply the substantive maritime law to products liability claims may be suspect. Compare Shennan v. Johnson & Towers Baltimore,
Inc., 760 F. Supp. 499, 501-02 (D. Md. 1990) (distinguishing East River on its
facts and pennitting recovery of economic losses because of the non-commercial nature of the vessel), with Reliance Ins. Co. v. Carver Boat Corp., No.
CIV.A.WMN-96-194, 1997 WL 714900, *3-4 (D. Md. May 29, 1997) (observing
that there is no distinction between a commercial or non-commercial vessel
upon which purchase pennit a recovery).
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The seminal case from the United States Supreme Court providing the determinative demarcation of when state law is applicable
to an admiralty action is Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen. 147 Pursuant to
a state statute, the Workmen's Compensation Commission of New
York awarded a decedent's spouse and surviving children a fixed
weekly amount because his accidental death happened during the
course of employment. 148 The Supreme Court held that the New
York Workmen's Compensation Act attempted "to give [a remedy
that] is of a character wholly unknown to the common law, incapable of enforcement by the ordinary processes of any court and is
not saved to suitors from the grant of exclusive jurisdiction." 149
Observing that the saving to suitors clause allowed New York to
only provide a " 'common law remedy where the common law
[was] competent to give it,' "150 the Court deduced that the statutorily mandated remedy was not available under the common law and
was therefore constitutionally indefensible. 151 The Supreme Court
concluded that any state law that "works material prejudice to the
characteristic features of the general maritime law" is invalid. 152 Until Jensen s holding is completely repudiated by the Supreme Court,
it remains the best chart available to safely navigate the course between the reefs of conflicting state law and federal interest in
uniformity. 153
Notwithstanding the need for uniformity and consistency under
admiralty law, there are three reasons to permit state law to apply to
147. 244 U.S. 205 (1917), superseded on other grounds by 33 U.S.C. §§ 90144 (1994 &
Supp. III 1997).
148. The widow's decedent-a stevedore-was offioading lumber from the S.S. El
Oriente at the time of his demise. See id. at 207-08. While driving a small, electrically-powered freight truck loaded with lumber, the stevedore jammed the
lumber on the guide pieces on a gangway. See id. at 208. Reversing the truck,
he went "at third or full speed" backwards from the gangway into the stop's
hold, stuck his head at the top of the hatch, and died. See id. The decedent's
employer objected to the award on various grounds, including its constitutionality. See id. at 209-10.
149. See id. at 218.
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. Id. at 216.
153. Burrell, supra note 131, at 80 ("Jensen still appears to supply the only test for
determining when the uniformity [principles in admiralty] can be sacrificed
without producing a degree of unpredictability that damages all maritime interests."). But see Robertson, supra note 105, at 89 ("Jensen has never been a
good guide, and today is completely discredited. Anyone who places serious
reliance on any of its teachings is as likely to be fooled as enlightened.").
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admiralty cases heard in state courts. 154 First, state law may fill a gap
left by inadequate federal statutes or in the general maritime law. 155
Where clear federal guidance is absent, state courts are free to fashion their own rule. 156 Second, in certain actions, local interests may
predominate. ls7 Third, state law rights or remedies may be applied
154. See Burrell, supra note 131, at 63.
155. See id. ("No body of law provides a rule for every conceivable situation.").
156. See id. at 64 (citing Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310
(1955». In Wilburn Boat Co., a recreational vessel caught fire while it was used
in violation of an insurance policy on an artificial lake, Lake Texahoma, situated between Texas and Oklahoma. See Wilburn Boat Co., 348 U.S. at 31l. The
Wilburn Boat Co. Court decided to "leave the regulation of marine insurance
where it has been-with the States" rather than to fashion a judicial rule as
part of the general maritime law. fd. at 32l. In dissent, Justice Reed wrote:
It is not only in markings, lights, signals, and navigation that States
are barred from legislation interfering with maritime operation. The
need for a uniform rule is just as great when dealing with the effect
to be given to marine insurance on boats which plough our navigable waters. A vessel moves from State to State along our coasts or rivers. State lines may run with the channel or across it. Under maritime custom an insurance policy usually covers the vessel wherever it
may go. If uniformity is needed anywhere, it is needed in marine insurance. It is like the question of seaworthiness which must be controlled by one law.
fd. at 333 (Reed, J., dissenting). Despite criticism from admiralty law scholars
for offending admiralty uniformity principles, Wilburn Boat Co. has never been
abrogated. See 1 PARKS, at supra note 7, at 13 ("Wilburn cast the law of marine
insurance into a state of turmoil."); see also LESUE J. BURGESS. MARINE INSUR.
ANCE AND GENERAL AVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 34-36 (3d ed. 1991) (observingthat Wilburn Boat Co. is "widely criticized").
157. See Burrell, supra note 131, at 64; see also Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City
of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 447 (1960) (observing that the city of Detroit could
enforce a criminal ordinance prohibiting a steamship's smoke stacks from
emitting black smoke on vessels that were approved and licensed by the federal government to operate in interstate commerce). In Huron Portland Cement
Co., the Supreme Court acknowledged that local interests of a port city could
affect marine navigation and commerce, ordinarily federal interests. See id.
("The mere possession of a federal license, however, does not immunize a
ship from the normal incidents of local police power, not constituting a direct
regulation of commerce."). Furthermore, "the local regulation of wharves and
docks" is a permissible local interest. fd. (citing Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105
U.S. 559 (1881». Yet, there is a fine line drawn here; for example, federally
licensed vessels are exempt from local quarantine laws and local pilotage laws.
See id. (citing Morgan's Louisiana & T.R. & S.S. Co. v. Louisiana Board of
Health, 118 U.S. 455 (1886); Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (How.) 299 (1851). The dissenters in Huron Portland Cement Co.
opined: "If local law required federally licensed vessels to observe local speed
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in cases where there is a need to supplement eXIstmg mantIme
law. ISS However, as one commentator stated: "The 'supplemental'
use of state law is most damaging to uniformity and its attendant
value of predictability." IS9 A court's use of state law to supply a remedy in a hard case, such as when a child is killed in a maritime accident l60 or when a swimmer is injured by a recreational vessel's propellers,161 and where the remedy in admiralty is not as attractive as
that available under state law, could better be termed circumnavigation rather than supplementation. 162
Although the underlying policies of admiralty are clear, the
unapplicable law may vary from case to case. With its emphasis on
commercial trade and predictability, admiralty law shares very little
with the policy underpinnings of state common or statutory law;
therefore, the substantive remedies may vary drastically between admiralty and state law. Yet, before addressing the schism separating
state law and admiralty law on the recovery of purely economic
losses in a tort action, the practitioner must address the fundamental procedural issue of what court in which to file an admiralty
claim. The answer to this question is not trivial-the questions of
how "predominant" a state's interests are, how "clear" the general
maritime law is, and how "necessary" state law supplementation of
admiralty law is may hinge on who evaluates the competing federal
and local interests.

IV. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER THE MARITIME
PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIM
A. Admiralty Jurisdiction in General
With such a large number of recreational vessels registered in

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

laws, obey local traffic regulations, or dock at certain times or under prescribed conditions, we would have local laws not at war with the federal license, but complementary to it.~ Id. at 451 (Douglas, j., dissenting). The dissenting Justices further observed:
However the issue in the present case is stated it comes down to
making criminal in the Port of Detroit the use of a certificate issued
under paramount federal law . . . . Never before, I believe, have we
recognized the right of local law to make the use of an unquestionably legal federal license a criminal offense.
[d. at 454 (Douglas, j., dissenting).
See Burrell, supra note 131, at 63, 78-80.
[d. at 79.
See, e.g., Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996).
See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
See Burrell, supra note 131, at 80.
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Maryland,163 practitioners may face the task of bringing or defending against a potential maritime claim. l64 Admiralty actions have several markedly different features that set them apart from the typical
state court action. Not only is there unique nautical language used
by both commercial mariners and recreational sailors,165 but the
maritime claim will have different rules of decision and procedure. l66 There are also unique jurisdictional considerations that apply to a maritime dispute. 167 Moreover, federalism concerns may
163. In 1996, there were 194,266 motorboats registered in Maryland. See U.S. DEP'T
OF TRANSP., supra note 1, at 21; see also 46 U.S.C. §§ 12,301'{)9 (1987) (addressing the numbering of undocumented vessels). This number does not include
"documented yachts," which are vessels not registered by Maryland authorities, but enrolled as vessels under federal statutes. See 46 U.S.C. § 12,102
(documenting vessels "of at least 5 net tons that is not registered under the
laws of a foreign country is' eligible for documentation" if the owner meets
certain criteria).
164. See 8 BENEDICf, supra note 23, at xiv ("With the general decline of commercial
shipping throughout the world and the dramatic increase in recreational
boating ... admiralty law is no longer the exclusive domain of 'old salt sea
lawyers' practicing in the august halls of various United States District Courts
throughout the land."). For practical guidance on the most common situations involving recreational vessels,' see WARREN J. MARWEDEL ET AL .. RECREA·
TIONAL CRAFT: JURISDICTION, CLAIMS & COVERAGE (1990).
165. For a useful primer of maritime subjects and nautical terms for an attorney
facing a recreational vessel claim, see CHAPMAN, supra note 59, at 1-28; 8 BENEDICf, supra note 23, at App. Naut-l.
166. For example, absent explicit federal statutory authority to the contrary, there
is no constitutional right to a jury trial in an admiralty action tried in a federal court. See T.N.T. Marine Serv., Inc. v. Weaver Shipyards & Drydocks, Inc.,
702 F.2d 585, 586-87 (5th Cir. 1983); 9 WRIGHT. ET AL. supra note 27, § 2315, at
116. This may not be the case if the maritime claim is brought in a state
court. See Robertson, supra note 82, at 705 ("[T]he thought is that in the substantive realm there is some room for state law supplementation of the federal maritime law, whereas in the procedural realm, the state courts are free
to go their own way."). Although the substantive law to determine parties'
rights and liabilities is the same whether in the federal or state forum, a plaintiff who elects to proceed in state court may exercise a right to a jury trial. See
Midland Enter. v. Brasher, 886 F.2d 812, 814 (6th Cir. 1989) ("One of the remedies saved to suitors was the right to trial by jury. . . . "). In the Fourth Circuit, juries may even hear claims against different parties on admiralty and
non-admiralty grounds, each having a different subject-matter jurisdictional
basis but brought together in one suit. See Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp.,
71 F.3d 148, 151-54 & nn.5,6 (4th Cir. 1995) (addressing an action where several defendants were sued under negligence and products liability theories,
but where the plaintiff relied upon diversity jurisdiction to reach one defendant and admiralty jurisdiction to reach the co-defendant).
167. See infra Part N.B.
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limit or even forestall a remedy in favor of admiralty uniformity
principles. 168

B. Procedural Aspects of a Maritime Products Liability Claim
Regardless of whether a state or federal court hears a dispute
arising out of a defective recreational vessel or its component parts,
admiralty jurisdiction must be initially pleaded in accordance with
the court's rules of procedure. 169 The particular pleading requirements of different jurisdictions are "neither numerous or difficult
but do require attention" if practitioners intend to invoke admiralty
jurisdiction. 17o Even if properly. pleaded, not all of Maryland's state
territorial waters 171 will provide· the necessary situs for admiralty tort
168. See infra notes 22941 and accompanying text.
169. See T.N. T. Marine Scrv. Inc., 702 F.2d at 587-88 (discussing the pleading require-

ments of Rule 9(h) and the consequences of improperly pleading under the
rule). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h) provides in relevant part:
A pleading or count setting forth a claim for relief within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiCtion that is also within the jurisdiction of
the district court on some other ground may contain a statement
identifying the claim as an admiralty or maritime claim for the purposes of Rules 14(c), 38(e), 82,and the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. If the claim is cognizable only
in admiralty, it is an admiralty or maritime claim for those purposes
whether so identified or not. The amendment of a pleading to add
or withdraw an identifying statement is governed by the principles of
Rule 15. A case that includes an admiralty or maritime claim within
this subdivision is an admiralty case within 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (3).
FED. R CN. P. 9(h). But see MD. RULE 2-303(b) ("Each averment of a pleading
shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleadings are required.").
170. 8 BENEDlcr, supra note 23, § 2.01 [B], at 2-3.
171. State territorial waters exclusively navigable by recreational vessels may provide
the necessary situs required for extending admiralty tort jurisdiction. See Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 677 (1982); Mullenix v. United
States, 984 F.2d 101, 104 (4th Cir. 1993). But see 33 U.S.C. § 59 (1986) (declaring that the northwest branch of the Patapsco River to be non-navigable); 33
U.S.C. § 59k (1986) (declaring that the south prong of the Wicomico River to
be non-navigable). Whether a privately-owned lake such as Deep Creek Lake
will provide the necessary situs element required for admiralty tort jurisdiction is an open question that has not been specifically adjudicated. However,
at least one court has found that admiralty tort jurisdiction may not be
proper where a man-made lake is without present navigability in fact. See
Reeves v. Mobile Dredging & Pumping Co., 26 F.3d 1247,1253(3d Cir. 1994) (holding that a man-made, land-locked lake was non-navigable for federal jurisdiction purposes).
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jurisdiction 172 nor do all disputes involving boats and watercraft necessarily invoke admiralty jurisdiction. 173
However, in establishing admiralty jurisdiction, there is little
discrimination between vessel types 174 or between commercial and
non-commercial vessels. 175 Admiralty jurisdiction of the federal
courts has been established for a jet ski 176 and other small craft,177 as
well as super tankers;178 ultimately, the size or use of a vessel is not
172. The United States Supreme Court has decided that an admiralty tort claim
arising out of a collision between two recreational vessels on a state's territorial waters can properly be within federal admiralty jurisdiction so long as the
tort claim bears a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. See
Foremost Ins. Co., 457 U.S. at 674-77.
173. For the court to exercise admiralty jurisdiction over a tort claim, several prerequisites are necessary. In Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock
Co., 513 U.S. 527 (1995), the Supreme Court held that to properly obtain admiralty jurisdiction over a tort claim, the tort must have (1) occurred on navigable waters, and (2) the underlying facts of the incident must bear a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity, and (3) have a potential
impact on maritime commerce. See id. at 532-34.
174. A variety of floating objects with differing sizes, purposes, and styles are defined as vessels. See 1 U.S.C. § 3 (1994) ("The word 'vessel' includes every
description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on the water."). Several other federal
statutes define vessels somewhat differently for various purposes and produce
varying results. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § 1-6 (explaining the difficulty
of defining what is a "vessel"). A seaplane taxiing on the water is considered a
vessel for the purposes of collision regulations, but is not a vessel while in the
air. Compare 33 U.S.C. §§ 2003(e), 2018(d) (1994), with 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.113,
91.115 (1998).
175. See Foremost Ins. Co., 457 U.S. at 675 (explaining that when determining the existence of admiralty jurisdiction, the courts should not distinguish between
vessel types based solely on whether they are for commercial or pleasure use).
176. A jet ski is described as:
a small, low profile, motorized vessel-seven feet long, two feet high,
and two feet wide--designed with a narrow beam to enhance its maneuverability. It is designed to be driven at speeds of up to 35 m.p.h.
with the operator in a standing or kneeling position; balance is required to operate it.
Martell v. Boardwalk Enter., 748 F.2d 740, 744 (2d Cir. 1984) (addressing a
boating accident on Lake George in northern New York where the operator
of a recreational boat struck a rented jet ski driven by a teenager).
177. See Keys Jet Ski, Inc. v. Kays, 893 F.2d 1225, 1229 (11th Cir. 1990) (applying admiralty law to a case involving a seven-foot jet ski); Feige v. Hurley, 89 F.2d
575, 576 (6th Cir. 1937) (applying admiralty law to a case involving a 15-foot
Chris-Craft motorboat).
178. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 859-60
(1986).
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relevant to establishing admiralty jurisdiction, so long as the claim
involves a vessel. I79 The nature of the underlying claim dictates
proper subject matter jurisdiction, as there are different jurisdictional requirements for admiralty tort claims and maritime contract
actions. ISO
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Admiralty Tort Claims
For the Maryland court to exercise admiralty jurisdiction over a
tort claim, several prerequisites must be met. lSI In Jerome B. Grubart,
Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock CO.,IS2 the United States Supreme
Court refined their holdings from an earlier trilogy of maritime
cases to set forth specific requirements. IS3 There, a contractor
sought to limit liability for damages resulting from the flooding of a
179. See Provost v. Huber, 594 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1979). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit affirmed the lower court's denial of admiralty jurisdiction in a case where the plaintiff asserted "that the tractortrailer being used to carry [a house over the frozen surface of a lake] was a
vessel within the meaning of maritime law because it was transporting the
structure over water." Id. Before completing the trek across the lake, the tractor trailer broke through the ice and the house eventually sunk to the bottom
of Lake Superior. See ill. The court concluded that "[b]y no stretch of the imagination can we equate a multi-wheeled device, designed and built for the
purpose of transportation over a hard, defined surface-such as roads, highways, and even ice-with a vessel or ship as those terms are used in maritime
law." Ill.
180. See Robertson, supra note 82, at 690-93; Marwedel, supra note 44, at 426-47. But
see SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, §§ 1-10, & 57 n.13 (discussing the jurisdictional prerequisites for admiralty and observing that products liability cases in
admiralty have eroded this doctrine).
181. See infra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
182. 513 U.S. 527 (1995).
.
183. See id. at 532-33 (citing Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 363, 365-67 (1990); Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674-75 (1982); Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 260 (1972». The Grubart Court
observed that the traditional inquiry used by courts to examine whether a
claim fell under admiralty law was simple: if the tort occurred on navigable
waters, then admiralty jurisdiction was applied. See id. at 531. IT the wrong did
not happen while on navigable waters, then admiralty jurisdiction could not
be applied. See ill. at 531-32.
In 1948, the United States Congress enacted the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, now codified at 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1994), to "end concern over
the sometimes confusing line between land and water, by investing admiralty
with jurisdiction over 'all cases' where the injury was caused by a ship or
other vessel on navigable water, even if such injury occurred on land." Jerome
B. Grubart, Inc., 513 U.S. at 532 (citing Gutierrez v. Waterman 8.S. Corp., 373
U.S. 206, 209-10 (1963); Executive Jet Aviation, Inc., 409 U.S. at 260.
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freight tunnel that purportedly resulted from the contractor's negligent weakening of the tunnel structure while driving pilings into
the riverbed. l84 The Supreme Court held that to properly obtain admiralty jurisdiction over a tort claim, the tort must (1) have occurred on navigable waters,185 and (2) involve underlying facts that
bear a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity186 that
has the potential to materially impact maritime commerce. 187
The first prong of the Grubart jurisdictional test, the situs/location element,188 requires that the tort occur on navigable waters un-

184. SeeJerome B. Grubart, Inc., 513 U.S. at 529-30.
185. "Navigable waters" are defined as "not only ... the main sea, but ... all the
navigable waters of the United States ... whether landlocked or open, salt or
fresh, tide or no tide." Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 25
(1870). However, it should be noted that the definition of "navigability" in
some federal contexts does not necessarily bind a determination of navigability under admiralty law. See 33 U.S.C.S. § 1362(7) (1986)(defining navigability
for the Clean Water Act). There is an additional factor: the water must be
presently navigable in fact. See Mullenix v. United States, 984 F.2d 101, 104-05
(4th Cir. 1993). In Mullinex, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit overruled the trial court's holding that the waters of the Potomac River above dam number five were beyond the reach of admiralty tort jurisdiction. See id. at 105. The court's rationale was based on the fact that the
Potomac River had substantial commercial interstate ferry traffic, which made
the river "navigable in fact" for the purposes of admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction. See id. at 104 & n.3. But see LeBlanc v. City of Cleveland, 979 F. Supp.
142, 14546 (N.D.N.Y 1997) (dismissing a claim for personal injuries sustained
from a collision between a kayak and recreational vessel for lack of admiralty
jurisdiction because the waterway was not navigable in fact). In LeBlanc, the
court held that the Hudson River area where the accident occurred was not
navigable in fact because of man-made dams and natural obstructions and
therefore did not satisfy the situs element required to sustain admiralty tort
jurisdiction. See id. at 146.
However, there is no requirement that the body of water be natural-a navigable waterway can be artificially created. In Ex Parte Buyer, 109 U.S. 629, 632
(1884), the Supreme Court held that admiralty jurisdiction extended to the Illinois and Michigan canal, which is an artificial but "navigable waterway connecting Lake Michigan and the Chicago River with the Illinois [R] iver and
the Mississippi [R] iver." Id. at 631.
186. SeeJerome B. Grubart, Inc., 513 U.S. at 527 (citing Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358,
363-64 n.2 (1990».
187. See id. at 533 (citing Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 675
(1982».
188. See id. at 533 (citing Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249,
268 (1972) (affixing a nexus test onto the requirement that the tort must
have occurred on navigable waters for admiralty jurisdiction to attach».
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less extended by the authority of the Extension of Admiralty Act. 189
As a matter of law, the definition of navigable waters must be determined by the federal courts or Congress. l90 Therefore, state laws or
state court holdings are not determinative of navigability for the
purposes of admiralty jurisdiction. 191 Waterways are considered navigable if " 'they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their
ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade
and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of
trade and travel on water.' "192 Despite admiralty's historical emphasis on maritime commerce, the Court specifically noted that "a
purely recreational waterway can be navigable for admiralty
purposes." 193
The second prong of the Grubart test contains two elements for
determining whether admiralty tort jurisdiction can be extended
over an alleged maritime tort. The Supreme Court mandated that
the facts presented have " 'a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce' "194 and a substantial connection to traditional maritime activity.195 The first element of the second prong is met when
189. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1994).
190. See 14A WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 27, § 3671 (discussing the source and scope
of the jurisdiction of federal courts in admiralty matter). See also supra note
185.
191. See Pugent Sound Power & Light Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
644 F.2d 785, 788 (1981) (citing Brewer-Elliot Oil & Gas Co. v. United States,
260 U.S. 77, 87 (1922); Wisconsin v. Federal Power Comm'n, 214 F.2d 334,
336-37 (7th Cir. 1954».
192. Mullenix v. United States, 984 F.2d 101, 104 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting The
Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557,563 (1870».
193. Id.
194. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc., 513 U.S. at 527 (quoting Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358,
364 n.2 (1990».
195. Id. at 533. This element is a distillation of three separate admiralty holdings.
See Sisson, 497 U.S. at 367 (holding that a fire on a yacht berthed at a marina
generated a sufficient nexus to traditional maritime activity); Foremost Ins.
Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 677 (1982) (holding that a collision of two
recreational vessels on navigable waters was within admiralty jurisdiction); Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972) (holding
that an alleged wrong must bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity). Executive Jet involved tort claims stemming from an aborted
take-off of an aircraft that crashed into the navigable waters of Lake Erie. See
id. at 250. Based upon "judicial, legislative, and scholarly recognition" that "a
purely mechanical application of the locality test" was problematic in determining whether admiralty jurisdiction was proper, the Executive Jet Court concluded that "maritime locality alone is not a sufficient predicate . . . . " Id. at
261. The Supreme Court then fashioned a nexus test, requiring that "the
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the allegedly tortious incident, described "at an intermediate level
of possible generality,"196 can adversely affect maritime commerce,
especially where vessel navigation or maritime operations could be
impeded. 197 The latter element of the second prong of the Grubart
inquiry turns on whether the conduct at issue, regardless of
whether commercial or noncommercial in nature, "is so closely related to activity traditionally subject to admiralty law that the reasons for applying special admiralty rules would apply. . . . " 198
The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the argument that torts
on or involving recreational vessels should fall outside admiralty jurisdiction. l99 The Court concluded that such a distinction would be
offensive to the principle of admiralty uniformity.2°O Although the

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

wrong bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity." Id. at
268.
Foremost Insurance Co. was the second case in this trilogy. Focusing on the applicable law for a collision between an eighteen-foot pleasure craft and a sixteen-foot recreational fishing vessel on the Amite River in Louisiana, see Faremost Ins. Co., 457 U.S. at 678, the Supreme Court held that "a collision
between two vessels on navigable waters properly states a claim within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts." Id. at 677. In dissent, Justice Powell
opined that "there is no substantial federal interest that justifies a rule extending admiralty jurisdiction to the edge of absurdity." Id. at 678 (Powell, j.,
dissenting). Noting that "[t]his case only involves pleasure craft," Justice Powell concluded that there was "no connection with any historic federal admiralty interest." Id. at 680 (Powell, J., dissenting).
In the third case of the trilogy, Sisson v. Ruby, the Court extended admiralty
law to a dispute arising from a fire aboard a yacht and explained that the
"relevant 'activity' is defined not by the particular· circumstances of the incident, but by the general conduct from which the incident arose." Sisson, 497
U.S. at, 364. Maintaining that the Foremost Insurance Co. holding should not be
restrictively read, the Sisson Court explained that navigation was merely one
example of the types of traditional maritime activities that could satisfy the
nexus element of the jurisdictional test elucidated in Executive Jet. See id. at
365. The Supreme Court observed that "navigation, storing and maintaining a
vessel at a marina on a navigable waterway is substantially related to traditional maritime activity." Id. at 367. Although urged by Justice Scalia to abandon the potentiality requirement altogether, the Sisson Court declined. See id.
at 364 n.2. The Sisson Court also explicitly declined to adopt any of the more
formulaic approaches then used by the federal circuits. See id. at 367 n.4.
Jerome B. Grubart, Inc., 513 U.S. at 538.
See id. at 539.
Id.
Sisson, 497 U.S. at 367.
See id. The Sisson Court further opined: "The need for uniform rules of maritime conduct and liability is not limited to navigation, but extends at least to
any other activities traditionally undertaken by vessels, commercial or non-
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primary purpose of admiralty is to protect mantIme commerce,2°l
recreational vessels operate co-extensively with commercial vessels
on navigable waters under unifonn navigation rules. 202 Thus, pleasure craft torts have the capacity to endanger commercial shipping,203 which is within the federal interest. 204
2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Maritime Contract Claims

A maritime contract claim lies within admiralty jurisdiction if it
meets judicially mandated subject-matter prerequisites. The Supreme Court held that detennining whether admiralty jurisdiction
should be extended over a contract dispute is based on the court's
inquiry as to:
whether the contract was or was not a maritime contract.
If it was, [admiralty] jurisdiction was asserted; if it was not,
the jurisdiction was denied. And whether [the contract] was
maritime or not maritime depended, not on the place
where the contract was made, but on the subject-matter of
the contract. If that was maritime the contract was
maritime. 205
Therefore, the applicability of admiralty principles to a contract
depend on the court's characterization of the work to be perfonned
pursuant to the agreement. Contracts that concern the charter of a
ship,206 shipping cargo by a vessel,207 wharfage or dock rental for a
commercial." Id.
201. See Foremost Ins. Co., 457 U.S. at 674 ("[T]he primary focus of admiralty jurisdiction is unquestionably the protection of maritime commerce .... ").
202. See id. at 676. (" [T]he federal [collision regulations also known as the nautical] 'Rules of the Road,' [are] designed for preventing collisions on navigable
waters . . . [and] apply to all vessels without regard to their commercial or
noncommercial nature.").
203. SeeJerome B. Grubart, Inc., 513 U.S. at 538-39.
204. See Foremost Ins. Co., 457 U.S. at 674-75 ("The federal interest in protecting
maritime commerce cannot be adequately served if admiralty jurisdiction is
restricted to those individuals actually engaged in commercial maritime activity.").
205. New England Mut. Marine Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 29
(1870). See generally Marwedal, supra note 44, at 448 (indicating that admiralty
contract jurisdiction applies to contracts relating "to the navigation, business,
or commerce of the sea"); Robertson, supra note 82, at 694-98 (discussing the
types of maritime contracts that fall within admiralty contract jurisdiction);
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § 1-10 (discussing admiralty contract jurisdiction);
14A WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 27, § 3675.
206. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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vessel,208 the towage of other vessels209 or a flotilla of barges,210 the
salvage of a sunken vessel,2l1 and the delivery of the ship's fueP12
have all been considered maritime contracts by the courts.2J3 However, a contract for the sale of a vessel 214 or the building of avesseP15 is not considered a maritime contract,216 but a contract for re207. See Morewood v. Enequist, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 491,493-94 (1859). The Supreme
Court "decided that chaiter-parties and contracts of affreightment are 'maritime contracts' within the true meaning and construction of the Constitution
and act of Congress, and cognizable in courts of admiralty.... " Id.
208. Thomson v. Chesapeake Yacht Club, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 555, 560 (D. Md. 1966)
("Dock or wharf accommodations are a necessity of navigation, . . . and
claims arising out of contracts with respect thereto have been held to be
within the admiralty jurisdiction.") (citations omitted).
209. See The Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638, 643 (1900) ("That a
contract to tow another vessel is a maritime contract is too clear for argument, and there is no distinction in principle between a vessel and a [towed
vessel].") .
210. See generally, e.g., Cross Contracting Co. v. Law, 454 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1972) ..
211. See Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 56 F.3d 556,
561 (4th Cir. 1995) (addressing the salvage of the S.S. Central America while returning from California with over a then-valued $1,000,000 in gold cargo on
board).
212. See Exxon Corp. v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 155, 161 (1989), a/I'd,
904 F.2d 33, reu'd on other grounds, 500 U.S. 603 (1991) (addressing the dispute
over an agency contract for fueling the M/V Green Harbour, a large cargo
ship).
213. See ScHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § 1-10, at 59-63.
214. See Flota Martima Browning de Cuba v. Snobel, 363 F.2d 733, 735 (4th Cir.
1966). The court observed: "Although subjected to ... criticism, the prevailing rule has been that a contract for the sale of a ship is not a maritime contract." Id. at 735 (citing the criticism by GILMORE & BlACK, supra note 24, § 1-4
and Note, Admiralty Jurisdiction and Ship-8ale Contracts, 6 STAN. L. REv. 540, 54546 (1954».
215. Hatteras of Lauderdale, Inc. v. Gemini Lady, 853 F.2d 848, 850 (lIth Cir. 1988)
("Until a vessel is completed and launched it does not become a ship in the
legal sense, and therefore admiralty jurisdiction does not exist.") (citing
North Pac. S.S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Marine Ry. & Shipbuilding Co., 249 U.S. 119,
127 (1918».
216. See Thames Towboat Co. v. The Francis McDonald, 254 U.S. 242, 243 (1920)
("Under decisions of this court the settled rule is that a contract for the complete construction of a ship ... is non-maritime, and not within the admiralty
jurisdiction.") (citing North Pac. S.S. Co., 249 U.S. at 125; The Winnebago, 205
U.S. 354, 363 (1907); Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 532 (1874); Roach
v. Chapman, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 129 (1859); People's Ferry Co. v. Beers, 61
U.S. (20 How.) 393 (1857»; see also Frankel v. Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard,
Inc., 46 F. Supp. 242, 245 (D. Md. 1942) ("It is well settled in this country that
the work of building a ship is not a maritime contract even though the ship
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pairs217 may be held to be one, depending on the facts of the
case.218 Moreover, a contract that is for the repair of a boat, but is
so extensive as to be a total rebuilding of a vessel, arguably may not
be a maritime contract. 219
3. The Similarity Between the Jurisdictional Requirements for Admiralty Tort and Contract Claims
There is some common ground between the jurisdictional requirements for tort claims and contract claims under admiralty law.
Regardless of whether a maritime claim arises in tort or contract,
claim may fall under admiralty law without regard to jurisdictional
amount220 or diversity of the parties. 221 However, if the parties are
diverse and the jurisdictional amount is met,222 a case involving maritime matters may be heard on the civil law side of the federal
docket.223 Federal question jurisdiction can also be asserted in mari- .
time matters224, but admiralty jurisdiction itself is not a federal ques- .
tion.225 Moreover, an action with non-admiralty claims,226 which belongs on the civil law side of the federal docket, may be properly

a

may have been launched.").
217. See Robert E. Blake, Inc. v. Excel Envtl., 104 F.3d 1158, 1160 (1997)
("[G]enerally . . . a contract to repair a ship is governed by admiralty law
while a contract to build a ship is not.").
218. See id. at 1160-62 (concluding that a ship repair contract fell outside the definition of a maritime contract because the ship had been indefinitely withdrawn from navigation).
.
219. Id. (applying the dead ship doctrine to an contract claim in admiralty).
220. See Robert E. Blake, Inc., 104 F.3d at 1160-62.
221. See 14A WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 27, § 3676, at 414 ("[I]n a suit brought
under the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal district courts, neither complete diversity of citizenship nor a minimum jurisdictional amount in controversy is required.").
222. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(b) (1994). The amount in controversy must be at least
$75,000. See id.
223. See 5 WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 27, § 1211.
224. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994); see also WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 27, § 1014.
225. See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 373 (1959),
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498
U.S. 19, 33 (1990).
226. See Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 152 (4th Cir. 1995) ("Federal courts are authorized, in one civil action, to exercise several types of subject matter jurisdiction historically exercised by separate courts, including
courts of law, equity, and admiralty."). The Vodusek court further observed:
"As a result, a single federal court has at least three separate departmentslaw, equity, and admiralty--each of which has its own traditional procedures."
Id.
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heard with pendant federal claims cognizable only in admiralty.227 In
addition, supplemental state law claims can be heard in an admiralty action as long as they stem from a "common nucleus of operative fact. "228

4. Venue and Other Considerations
Once subject matter jurisdiction is established, the next logical
question is in what court the action should be brought. The plaintiff in a marine products liability case has complete discretion to
choose the forum in which the claim will be heard. 229 Current rules
of procedure essentially allow "forum shopping,"230 because the
maritime plaintiff can choose to file a claim in the federal court sitting in admiralty, on the civil law side of federal court, or in a state
court.23I Another advantage that inures to the plaintiff filing a claim
in admiralty, as opposed to a common law dispute filed in federal
court, is that the normal federal venue rules 232 are inapplicable. 233 It
was decided more than a century ago that admiralty proceedings
are not considered civil actions within the meaning of the federal
statutes pertaining to venue. 234 Moreover, in admiralty cases, Maryland's "state courts . . . are not bound by the venue requirements
[and] they are not bound by the federal common law venue
rule . . . of forum non conveniens. "235 However, if the suit is filed in
227. See The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555,560 (1866) ("[WJhen parties go
into the Federal courts, they must show by the pleadings certain facts to give
the court jurisdiction."); see also FED. R CIV. P. 9(h) (requiring admiralty jurisdiction to be specifically pled).
228. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); see Motts
v. M/V Green Wave, 25 F. Supp. 2d 771, 776 (S.D. Tex. 1998). But see Lewis v.
United States, 812 F. Supp. 620, 624 (E.D. Va. 1993).
229. See 15 WRIGHT. ET AL., supra note 27, at § 3848; see also CAliFORNIA PLEAsURE
BOATING LAw. supra note 136, at 226 ("The attorney dealing with small boat
litigation has considerable discretion in choosing among a competent state
court, the civil side of a federal district court, and the admiralty side of federal district court.").
230. The phrase "forum shopping" was coined by Judge J. Skelly Wright of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See Gita F.
Rothschild, Forum Shopping, 24 LmG., Spring 1998, at 40, 4041.
231. See supra note 230.
232. See generaUy 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1413 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
233. In re McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 647 F.2d 515, 516 (5th Cir. 1981) ("The regular venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391-93 are inapplicable in admiralty
cases."); see also 15 WRIGHT. ET AL., supra note 27, § 3817.
234. See 15 WRIGHT. ET AL., supra note 27, § 3817; see also infra note 235 and accompanying text.
235. American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994) (holding that the
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state court or is docketed on the civil law side of the federal court,
then the venue rules ordinarily applicable to plaintiffs will govern. 236
Even with this flexibility, many plaintiffs prefer to file in federal
court for reasons such as judges with diverse experience,237 a larger
and more diverse jury pool,238 and more efficient case handling with
quicker results. 239
Despite the advantages of federal court, there is a significant
number of plaintiffs that choose to file in state court. 240 Although
many claims entailing the loss of a pleasure craft caused by a defective marine product are customarily brought in the federal district
court rather than in a state court under the saving-to-suitors
clause, the substantive application of the general maritime law
should not differ. 241 While the underlying principles of consistency
and uniformity that are essential to admiralty law are clear, these
principals have increasingly faltered in the arena of marine products liability actions, especially as they result in recovery of economic losses.
V. PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE IN

ADMIRALTY
The character of marine product liability claims has had the attention of the admiralty bar ever since Judge Benjamin Cardozo
changed the face of tort law242 with his seminal majority opinion in
doctrine of forum non conveniens is inapplicable in admiralty).
236. See id. at 454 (noting that state courts, even when hearing an admiralty case,
are not bound by the federal venue statutes).
237. See Rothschild, supra note 229, at 44 ("Some lawyers believe that an Article III
appointment, providing life tenure and a salary which can't be reduced, attracts higher-quality judges.") (citing Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Fmum
Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM.
U. L. REv. 369, 400 (1992».
238. See id. ("The jury pool may differ between state and federal courts."). In Maryland, the circuit court jury pool is drawn from the county or city populace,
whereas in federal court the jury pool is drawn from the whole state. Compare
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 8-102(a), 8-104 (1995), with 28 U.S.C. §§
1861-78 (1994). See also RONALD M. CHERRY & FRANK F. DAILY, CML TRIAL PROCEDURES IN MARYLAND 20 (MICPEL 1995) (discussing tactical considerations for
selection of the Maryland federal or state forum).
239. See Rothschild, supra note 230, at 41.
240. See Robertson, supra note 82, at 686-87 (discussing the increasing numbers of
admiralty cases heard in state courts).
241. See id.
242. See JOHN W. JOHNSON, HISTORIC U.S. COURT CAsES 1690-1990: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA
297-300 (1992) (describing MacPherson as the origin of consumer rights in
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MacPherson v. Buick Motor CO.,243 which abolished the contractual
privity requirement in favor of strict liability for an unreasonably
dangerous product. 244 Other jurisdictions,245 including Maryland,246
followed the lead of the Court of Appeals of New York and recognized strict liability as a distinct cause of action. 247 Marine products
tort law).
243. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). See 2 PARKS, supra note 7, at 1064 & n.63 ("It appears that the first maritime case to follow MacPherson as to the liability of a
remote shipbuilder was Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co." (citing Sieracki v. Seas
Shipping Co., 149 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1945), rev'd in part and afl'd in part on other
grounds, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), superseded by statute as noted by Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatiantique, 443 U.S. 256,262 & n.11 (1979»). In Sieracki,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained that "if [a
seaman] is injured on the ship in the course of unloading or loading [a] vessel he may have redress for a defect caused by its unseaworthiness." Sieracki,
149 F.2d at 102; see also Dennis W. Nixon, Products Liability and Pleasure Boats,
29 J. MAR. L. & COM. 243, 247 (1998) (As is well-known, MacPherson went to
sea in 1945 in Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co.).
244. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053. Speaking for the majority, Judge Cardozo
explained:
We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and
limb, when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows
out of contract and nothing else. We have put the source of the obligation where it ought to be. We have put its source in the law.
[d.
245. See gmerally William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citade~ 69 YALE LJ. 1099,
1100. 03 (1960) (chronicling the effect of MacPherson).
246. Even though Maryland appellate cases quoted MacPherson with approval or distinguished its tenets, Maryland's high court never expressly adopted the reasoning of MacPherson until 1951. In Otis Elevator Co. v. Embert, 198 Md. 585, 84
A.2d 876 (1951), the court of appeals recognized MacPherson: "[W]e shall assume that MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company and the cases which anticipated
or followed it are law in Maryland." [d. at 599, 84 A.2d at 882. For a historical
and legal analysis by the Maryland court of special appeals examining strict liability in tort for a defective product, see Valk Mfg. Co.. v. &ngasway, 74 Md.
App. 304, 310-23, 537 A.2d 622, 626-32 (1988), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds
Montgomery County v. Valk Mfg. Co., 317 Md. 185, 562 A.2d 1246 (1989).
247. See Robert A. Awsumb, Comment, Recovery of Economic Loss Under Section 402A,
91- PROD . LIAB. 1 (1986) (noting that there are essentially five different theories of recovery for a products liability claim). A litigant can press for recovery
in an action sounding in negligence, breach of express warranty, breach of
implied warranty of merchantability and/or fitness for its intended use, misrepresentation, or strict liability in tort. See id. (citing U.C.C. §§ 2-313 to 2-315
(providing express and implied warranties); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402B (1965) (covering negligent misrepresentation); Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962) (addressing strict liability in tort);
MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1050 (dealing with negligence» .
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liability claims are tort claims,248 sounding in strict liability and negligence. 249 The law of warranty may also playa significant role in the
adjudication of disputes arising in maritime law. Where contractual
privity is present, a breach of an express250 or implied25J warranty in
a shipbuilding or repair contract mayor may not be actionable in
tort,252 but may instead give rise to an action in contract. 253 This disUnder strict liability in tort, there are three theories under. which a court
may impose liability for an unreasonably dangerous product. As summarized
by the court of special appeals in Simpson v. Standard Container Co., 72 Md.
App. 199, 527 A.2d 1337 (1987), they are defective manufacture, defective design, and failure to warn. See id. (citing Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303
Md. 581, 495 A.2d 348 (1985) (concerning a defective design theory to recover for injuries incurred when a pair of pajamas caught fire); Eaton Corp. v.
Wright, 281 Md. 80, 375 A.2d 1122 (1977) (addressing a manufacturing defect
in a portable propane bottlc); Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 62 Md. App.
101, 488 A.2d 516 (1985) (grappling with insufficient warning of risk of injury); Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 41 Md. App. 579, 398 A.2d 490
(1979) (examining a manufacturing defect of van roof), rro'd on other grounds,
286 Md. 714, 410 A.2d 1039 (1980».
248. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 865-66
(1986) (adopting products liability as a maritime tort); see also John Minor
Wisdom, Admiralty Jurisdiction and Products Liability: Economic Loss, 62 TuL. L.
REv. 325, 325 (1988) ("Products liability is strict liability in tort unfettered by
notions of contractual warranty."); SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § 3-11.
249. See East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 865 ("We join the Courts of Appeals in
recognizing products liability, including strict liability, as part of the general
maritime law.") The Supreme Court also observed: "And to the extent that
products actions are based on negligence, they are grounded in principles already incorporated into the general maritime law." [d. at 866 (citing
Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 632 (1959».
250. See MD. CODE ANN., COMM. LAw I § 2-313 (1995). This section provides in pertinent part:
Express warranties by the seller are created as follows: [a]ny affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates
to the goods and becomes a part of the basis of the bargain creates
an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation
or promise.
[d.

251. See id. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (pertaining to the implied warranty of merchantability
and the implied warranty of fitness for particular use); see also AddressographMultigraph Corp. v. Zink, 273 Md. 277, 280, 329 A.2d 28, 31 (1974) ("Privity
of contract remains an essential ingredient . . . in a breach of express warranty action not involving personal injury, because privity between the plaintiff and defendant is [a] requisite to maintain a contract action . . . . " citing
Mackubin v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 190 Md. 52, 56-57 A.2d 318, 321 (1948»).
252. See ScHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § 1-11.
253. See id.
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tinction is crucial in a maritime products liability action so as to establish admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction. 254 If contractual privity
can be established, warranty claims fall outside of admiralty jurisdiction. 255 In addition, the " 'quasi-tort' theory of implied warranty is
not well settled in maritime product liability law. "256
The adoption of strict liability attracted many plaintiffs, including Maryland plaintiffs,257 to seek recovery under section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.258 In addition, many maritime plaintiffs sought to bring actions under this new theory.259 There were
many advantages to pleading tort claims for those that essentially
sound in warranty,260 devoid of personal inJury or other property
damage, as a mechanism to avoid both temporal26I and contractual
254. See supra Part IV.B.2.
255. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 872 n.7
(1986).
256. 8 BENEDICf, supra note 23, § 4.03[A], at 4-15.
·257. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp. 278 Md. 337, 34048, 363 A.2d 955, 95%1
(1976) (adopting section 402A); see also generaUy Gerson B. Mehlman, Recent
Decision, 6 U. BALT. L. REv. 295, 312 (1977) (recognizing that Phipps creates
greater accountability for those who supply and sell goods).
258. See Wisdom, supra note 248, at 325 (discussing maritime products liability). See
also infra note 277.
259. See 2 PARKS, supra note 7, at 1065 n.67. Schaeffer v. Michigan-Ohio Navigation
Co., 416 F.2d 217 (6th Cir. 1969) was "the first case in which an admiralty
court squarely considered the question whether a products liability suit is cognizable in admiralty." 2 PARKS, supra note 7, at 1065 n.67. The court decided
that an action for products liability would lie in admiralty. See Schaeffer, 416
F.2d at 221 (citing Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 149 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1945),
rev'd in part and aff'd in part on other grounds, 328 U.S. 85 (1946»; Sanderlin v.
Old Dominion Stevedoring Corp., 385 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1967); Noel v. United
Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1965». Observing that history indicates
that admiralty law (albeit slowly) incorporates the law prevailing on land
when there is no historic or statutory principle to the contrary, the court ·permitted the strict liability action to proceed. See id.
260. See East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 868. The East River Court explained:
"[T] he injury suffered-the failure of the product to function properly-is the
essence of a warranty action, through which a contracting party can seek to
recoup the benefit of its bargain." [d. The Court also opined that: "Damage
to a product itself is most naturally understood as a warranty claim." [d. at
872.
261. In Maryland, there is a three-year statute of limitations for most tort actions.
See MD. CoDE ANN .. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-101 (1995). However, the limitations
statute begins to run only when "the claimant in fact knew or reasonably
should have known of the wrong." Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 636,
431 A.2d 677, 680 (1981) (extending the "discovery rule" to all actions).
There is, however, a four-year statute of limitations for actions filed under the
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limitations. 262
Similar to the way judicially carved doctrines such as the unforeseeable plaintiff263 were created to limit a tortfeasor's liability,
courts also created doctrines to limit strict liability for a defective
product causing only economic losses. 264 Many jurisdictions do not
allow recovery in tort for a reasonably foreseeable harm that results
in purely economic losses, absent the nexus of privity of contract or
some other legally imposed relationship;265 otherwise, "contract law

262.

263.

264.

265.

Maryland Vnifonn Commercial Code. See MD. CODE ANN., COMM. LAw I § 2725 (1997); see also Washington Freightliner, Inc. v. Shantytown Pier, Inc., 351
Md. 616, 618, 719 A.2d 541, 542 (1998).
See Ainger v. Michigan Gen. Corp., 476 F. Supp. 1209, 1226 n.65 (S.D.N.Y.
1979). The court noted that a "seller's warranty is a curious hybrid, born of
the illicit intercourse of tort and contract, unique in the law." [d. (paraphrasing Prosser, supra note 245, at 1126). The court further stated: "Especially in
the area of products liability, the tort theory of breach of warranty has been
utilized to avoid the consequences of contract law with regard to privity, statute of limitations, survival of actions, and damages." [d. (citing WILLIAM L.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 95, at 634-35 (4th ed. 1971». Parties of relatively equal bargaining power may also seek to avoid the requirement of notice under the V.C.C. or avoid the effect of warranty disclaimers in
shipbuilding or repair contracts, which are known as "Red Letter" clauses in
admiralty parlance. See Howard M. McConnack, Warranties and Disclaimers, 62
TuL. L. REv. 549, 552 (1988).
See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928). As noted by the
Palsgraf court: The passenger far away, if the victim of a wrong at all, has a
cause of action, not derivative, but original and primary. His claim to be protected against invasion of his bodily security is neither greater nor less because the act resulting in the invasion is a wrong to another far removed. [d.;
see also JOHNSON, supra note 242, at 300·05 (discussing the unforeseeable plaintiff and proximate cause).
See Danforth v. Acorn Structures, Inc., 608 A.2d 1194, 1195 (Del. 1992) ("The
economic loss doctrine is a judicially created doctrine that prohibits recovery
in tort where a product has damaged only itself .... n); see also Seely v. White
Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965). The Seely court noted:
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for
physical injuries and warranty recovery for economiC loss is not arbitrary and does not rest on the 'luck' of one plaintiff in having an accident causing physical injury. The distinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer must
undertake in distributing his products. He can appropriately be held
liable for physical injuries caused by defects by requiring his goods to
match a standard of safety defined in tenns of conditions that create
unreasonable risks of hann. He cannot be held for the level of perfonnance of his products in the consumer's business....
[d. at 151.
See 1 ROBERT L. DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR LOST PRoms §§ 3.6-3.7, 3.9
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would drown in a sea of tort. "266
This rule is the "economic loss rule," which in essence bars recovery in tort for product-related economic losses267 unless accompanied by damage to property or physical injury to persons. 268 Like
the Court of Appeals of New York in MacPherson, the United States
Supreme Court fostered product safety269 by refusing to impose the
privity requirement in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki. 270 Instead, the
Court explicitly relied on the fundamental maritime duty to provide
a safe working environment and equipment on board ship so as not
to cause personal injury.271
Grounded in concerns over unseaworth y272 vessels, the Sieracki
Court considered the "shipowner's liability for unseaworthiness
as . . . essentially a species of liability without fault. "273 Thus, admiralty courts imposed strict liability for personal injuries resulting

266.
267.
268.
269.

270.
271.

272.

273.

(4th ed. 1992) (collecting cases and discussing the varying approaches of different jurisdictions allowing or denying a recovery for purely economic
losses). In an admiralty context, the rule barring purely economic losses in
tort flowed from the reasoning of Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275
U.S. 303 (1927). Even though the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had
negligently treated a vessel's propeller while in dry dock, the Court explained
that the purely economic losses of the third party owner sustained were
barred because "as a general rule, at least, a tort to the person or property of
one man does not make the tortfeasor liable to another, ... [t]he law does
not spread its protection so far." Id. at 309.
East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986)
(citing GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87-94 (1974».
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
See infra Part VI.
See also W. KIp VISCUSI & MICHAEL J. MOORE, Rationalizing the Relationship Between Product Liability and Innovation in Tort Law and the Public Interest 106 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991) ("Liability should also stimulate positive product
modifications, such as improved product warnings and incorporation of safety
design features.")
328 U.S. 85 (1946), overruled by statute as noted by Edmonds v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 262 & n.ll (1979).
See id. at 95. The Court held that the shipowner's duty of seaworthiness, traditionally owed to seamen, included protection for stevedores working aboard
the ship to load cargo. See id.
A noteworthy definition of unseaworthiness includes a vessel, its crew, or any
equipment on board that is unfit for its intended use. See Waldron v. MooreMcCormick Lines, Inc., 386 U.S. 724, 726-27 (1967); see also PARKS, su'pra note
7, at 53-54.
Sieracki., 328 U.S. at 94. Mter the Sieracki decision, one commentator observed
that unseaworthiness is a species of strict liability similar to products liability
in the sense that it is liability without regard to negligence. See SCHOENBAUM,
supra note 37, § 3-9, at 143 n.1.
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from the unseaworthiness of a vessel's defective equipment thirty
years prior to .the adoption of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts274 by the federal courts sitting in admiralty.275 The Maryland Court of Appeals had adopted section 402A a year earlier in
Phipps v. General Motors Cory.276 Only a minority of the federal circuit
courts sitting in admiralty initially embraced section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.277 This was in contravention of the trend
of the land courts, including Maryland, even though the underlying
policy grounds for strict liability were equally applicable to defective
marine products. 278 Most of the federal circuits sitting in admiralty
274. Section 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business
of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach
the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not
brought the product from or entered into any contractual relation
with the seller.
REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); see also Awsumb, supra note
247, at 3 ("The authors of Section 402A intended that it strike an equitable·
balance between the manufacturer's presumed expertise and control and the
relatively unsophisticated and unprotected status of the ordinary purchaser or
user") (citing REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. c); 2 PARKS, supra
note 7, at 1064; SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § ~.
275. See Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129,
1134 (9th Cir. 1977) (adopting section 402A).
276. 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976); see also AJ. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 333 Md. 245, 259, 634 A.2d 1330, 1337 (1994) (observing that
"fairness requires recovery for injuries caused to person or property resulting
from unreasonably dangerous products.... ").
277. See supra note 273; see also Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc., 565 F.2d at 1134 (adopting
section 402A); Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631, 636
(8th Cir. 1972) (adopting section 402A as "the best expression of the doctrine
as it is generally applied"); McKee v. Brunswick Corp., 354 F.2d 577, 584 (7th
Cir. 1965) (allowing recovery because personal injuries were caused by a defect in an unreasonably dangerous recreational vessel); Wisdom, supra note
247, at 331 (noting that a majority of courts of appeals sitting in admiralty follow the rule of Santor v. A & M Karaghuesian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305 (NJ. 1965».
278. See Wisdom, supra note 248, at 331 (citing Emerson C.M. Diesel, Inc. v. Alaskan Enter., 732 F.2d 1468, 1472 (9th Cir. 1984». See also Pan-Alaska Fisheries,
Inc., 565 F.2d at 1134 n.2 (observing that a majority of land courts adopted
section 402A). The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability is respon-
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rejected the Restatement approach for marine products liability
cases279 by adopting the minority approach of Santor v. A & M
Karaghuesian, Inc. 280
The Santor guideline was clear: a manufacturer had a duty to
build and sell a product that was not defective, irrespective of
whether the product's defect created an unreasonable risk of
harm. 281 In following this approach, federal courts sitting in admiralty usually dealt with marine products that directly impacted the
seafarer's livelihood or affected the mariner's safety at sea. 282 The
sive to this concern. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 21 (1998).
279. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 869 & n.5
(1986). But see Mary J. Davis, The Supreme Court and Our Culture of Irresponsibility, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1075, 1083 (1996) ("Labeling this a 'majority' approach overstates the state of the law at the time; actually, very few jurisdictions had addressed the question directly. The approach designed by the
Court as a 'minority' had, in fact, been adopted by a majority of the courts of
appeals at that time.").
280. 207 A.2d 305, 312-13 (NJ. 1965). The continuing validity of Santor, even under
New Jersey state law, is questionable at best. See Boyes v. Greenwich Boat
Works, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 543 (D.NJ. 1998) (discussing Alloway v. General
Marine Indus., 695 A.2d 264 (NJ. 1997). More recently, Alloway extended the
economic loss rule doctrine to transactions which could be characterized as
consumer sales, overruling an arguably conflicting decision in Santor. The
Santor approach permits a consumer to maintain an action in strict liability
for loss of value, whether or not the defect causes a risk of unreasonable
harm. See East River S.S. Crnp., 476 U.S. at 868-69 & n.4.
281. See Santor, 207 A.2d at 312-13.
282. See Emerson C.M. Diesel, Inc., 732 F.2d at 1472 (allowing recovery for economic
losses accrued when a fishing vessel's port reduction gear failed while underway in the Bering Sea), overruled on different grounds by East River S.S. Crnp., 476
U.S. 858. The Emerson court observed that "[t]he rationale for the rule allowing recovery of lost profits in an admiralty negligence action is 'the familiar principle that seamen are favorites of admiralty and their economic interests entitled to the fullest possible legal protection.' " Id. (quoting Carbone v.
Ursich, 209 F.2d 178, 182 (9th Cir. 1953) (allowing the crew members of a
fishing vessel to recover lost profits from owners of another vessel that negligently fouled their nets». Other courts have similarly allowed fishermen to
recover for economic losses due to the special solicitude given to them. See
Yarmouth Sea Prods. Ltd. v. Scully, 131 F.3d 389, 398-99 (4th Cir. 1997). In
Yannouth Sea Products Ltd., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that "the special rule applicable to [commercial] fishermen" permitted the recovery for proven lost profits from the catch ordinarily earned,
but lost, because of a collision caused by the inattentive lookout. See id. The
court exhibited this special solicitude despite an explicit notation that "the
Robins Dry Dock principle [of no recovery for economic losses in tort] is alive
and well in the Fourth Circuit." Id. But see McConnell v. Caterpillar Tractor

468

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 28

courts adopting the Santor approach allowed the recovery of economic losses in tort by rationalizing that there was no reason to arbitrarily preclude tort recovery where the product fortuitously injured itself without personal injury or damage to other property.283
Because of the contradictory philosophical approaches utilized by
the other federal circuits sitting in admiralty, the United States Supreme Court clearly needed to harmonize these differences. However, not until 1986 did the Court formally acknowledge products liability as an admiralty cause of action,284 after granting certiorari in
a case from the Third Circuit that had taken a unique approach by
disallowing recovery for economic losses utilizing a risk-of-harm balancing test. 285
VI. THE EAST RIVER DOCTRINE
A. Factual Background

In East River Steamship Carp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.,286 the
bareboat charterers287 of four American built288 and flagged supertankers 289 sought to recoup more than $8 million in costs for repair-

283.
284.

285.

286.
287.

288.
289.

Co., 646 F. Supp. 1520 (D. NJ. 1986) (refusing to award lost profits to commercial fisherman for products liability claim stemming from engine failure
caused by defective crankshaft), rejected by Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. General Elec.
Co., 134 F.3d 149, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1998).
See Emerson C.M. Diesel, Inc., 732 F.2d at 1474.
See East River S.S. Cary., 476 U.S. at 865. When the Supreme Court finally addressed the issue of whether to adopt products liability tenets into the substantive maritime law, there was nearly universal acceptance of this doctrine
by the federal courts sitting in admiralty. See Ocean Barge Transp. Co. v. Hess
Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 726 F.2d 121, 123 (3d Cir. 1984).
See East River S.S. Cary., 752 F.2d 903, aff'd sub nom., East River S.S. Cary., 476
U.S. 858 (1986).
.
476 U.S. 858 (1986).
A bareboat charter is, in essence, a maritime long-term rental contract. See
GILMORE & BlAcK, supra note 24, § 4-1, at 134 ("[T]he charterer takes over
the ship, lock, stock and barrel, and mans her with his own people. He becomes, in effect, the owner pro hac vice. ... "); see also East River S.S. Cary., 476
U.S. at 860 ("Each petitioner operated under a bareboat charter, by which it
took full control of the ship for 20 or 22 years as though it owned it, with the
obligation afterwards to return the ship[s] to the real owner." (citing GILMORE
AND BlACK, supra note 24, §§ 4-1, 4-22».
See East River S.S. Cary., 752 F.2d at 903.Q4.
See GREG S. MARsrON, TANKER OPERATIONS: A HANDBOOK FOR THE SHIP'S OFFICER
6-11 (1981). Supertankers are very-large crude carriers (VLCCs), "roughly [defined] as tankers of 160,000 [deadweight tonnage] and over" which usually
carry crude oil, but also can carry bulk refined petrochemical products as
cargo. Id. at 7. They are usually equipped with a "single steam turbine con-
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ing their steam-turbine propulsion units and for lost revenue incurred during voyage deviations and unscheduled shipyard
periods. 2OO The claims arose from the purportedly negligent design
and manufacture of the units as well as the negligent supervision of
the installation of the steam-turbines that powered the vessels. 291
Three of the four vessels suffered major engineering plant failures
while at sea.292 The fourth ship's engineering plant experienced
problems during its maiden voyage;293 its astern guardian valve had
been installed backwards and damaged the ship's main engine
when high-pressure steam entered the low-pressure turbine stage. 294

B. The Holding and Rationale of the East River Court

As a threshold matter, Justice Blackmun, writing for a unanimous Court, recognized that the federal circuits sitting in admiralty
had overwhelmingly adopted products liability concepts. 295 Without
much discussion,296 the East River Court felt compelled to "join the
Courts of Appeal in recognizing products liability in negligence, including strict liability, as part of the general maritime law"297 espe-

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

296.

297.

nected to the propeller shaft" for propulsion as was the case with these four
vessels. [d. VLCCs are the largest moving objects ever built. See id. at 10.
These supertankers were built by Seatrain Shipbuilding Corporation in Brooklyn, New York, and were christened as the Stuyvesant, the Williamsburg, the
Brooklyn, and the Bay Ridge. See East River S.S. Corp., 752 F.2d at 905. They were
an exception to the rule that "VLCCs are built in foreign yards and rarely fly
the American flag." Marston, supra, at 11 (citing Fig. 10, at page 14, a photograph of the Brooklyn, at 225,000 tons deadweight).
See East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 861.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 865 (citing Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 149 F.2d 98, 99-100 (3d Cir.
1945) (adopting liability without fault for unseaworthiness), rev'd in part and
affd in part on·other grounds, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), overruled by statute as noted by
Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatiantique, 443 U.S. 256, 262 & n.ll
(1979); Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d
1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 1977».
See Davis, supra note 279 at 1082 (chronicling the "culture of irresponsibility"
whereby institutional defendants are freed from tort liability and discussing
the Court's trend toward immunity from products liability). The author
opines that: "One would have thought that the [East River] Court would take
more time to explore fully the policies behind an area of law that had caused
turmoil in state courts for the previous twenty years." Id.
See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 865-66
(1986).
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cially in view of the Court's own precedents. 298 The Court also
found it desirable to harmonize the differing approaches taken by
the federal appellate courts to answer the question of whether a
marine products liability claim existed for injury to a product itself.
The East River Court examined the spectrum of answers
spawned by courts, Congress, and commentators. 299 Looking specifically at the approaches adopted by the land-based courts and federal courts sitting in admiralty, the Court observed that several distinct judicial philosophies had evolved to address the special
concerns created in the area of products liability3°O to resolve disputes, the resolution of which lie at the concursus 301 of tort and
contract. 302 As they had manifested themselves in the federal circuits, these differences precluded uniformity and decisional predictability-the touchstones of admiralty law. 303
Wanting to "keep products liability and contract law in separate
spheres and to maintain a realistic limitation on damages,"304 the
East River Court rejected the balancing-of-harm305 and minority loss
298. See Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376
U.S. 315, 318 & n.3 (1964) (addressing a stevedore's claim for a breach of implied warranty of workmanlike service even though the company acted without negligence in furnishing the allegedly defective equipment that injured
the employee); Sieracki., 328 U.S. at 97 (extending strict liability for the unseaworthiness of a vessel's cargo gear to stevedores).
299. See East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 868 & n.3.
300. See id. at 868-70 & nn.4-5.
301. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 292 (6th ed. 1990). Concursus is where "[i]n the
civil law, a running together ... or meeting ... of actions" occurs. !d. Concursus is also a legal term of art for an admiralty proceeding. See Complaint
of Dredging Equip., Inc., 851 F. Supp. 172, 175 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (explaining
that a concursus is a limitation of liability proceeding). A shipowner can limit
liability arising from a maritime tort without privity or knowledge of the occurrence to the value of the vessel and its pending earnings under 46 U.S.C.
App. § 183(a). See id. However, when the claimed amount is greater than the
value of the vessel and its pending freights its accounts receivables "the court
engages in a concursus, a proceeding where it determines 'whether there was
negligence, whether it was without the privity and knowledge of the owner;
and if limitation is granted, how the [limitation] fund should be distributed'"
!d. (quoting Universal Towing Co. v. Barrale, 595 F.2d 414, 417 (8th Cir.
1979) ).
302. SeeJay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L. REv. 661, 667
(1989) ("The problem of product-related economic loss ... could be treated
under either a tort or a contract rubric.").
303. See East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 863 & n.l.
304. Id. at 871.
305. See id. at 870. The East River Court characterized this approach as "attempting
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of value 306 positions, reasoning that warranty was the proper remedy
for a defective product causing only economic losses. 30 7 The Court
held that "a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty
under either a negligence or strict products-liability theory to prevent a product from injuring itself. "308 In denying the tort claims,
the Court explained that "[w] hen a product injures only itself the
reasons for imposing a tort duty are weak and those for leaving the
parties to its contractual remedies are strong. "309
The Supreme Court relied heavily on the inconsistency between the underlying purpose of products liability and the recovery
of purely economic losses. It indicated that the underlying policy
reasons for a tort cause of action sounding in products liability allows "more protection from dangerous products than is afforded by
the law of warranty. "310 Specifically with regard to the safety concerns underlying tort law, the Court observed: "[T] he tort concern
with safety is reduced when an injury is only to the product itself. "311 In contrast with personal injuries, which could create overwhelming misfortunes, the Court characterized the recovery of

306.

307.
308.

309.
310.
311.

to differentiate between 'the disappointed users . . . and the endangered
ones.'" [d. at 869-70 (quoting Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 575 P.2d 1383, 1387
(1978». The Court rejected the balancing-of-harm approach because it "essentially turn[ed] on the degree of risk, [which is] too indeterminate to enable manufacturers [to] easily ... structure their business behavior." [d. The
Court further reasoned that even if the irtiury to a product occurred in an
"abrupt, accident-like event," any recovery is geared to correcting "the failure
of the purchaser to receive the benefit of the bargain-traditionally the core
concern of contract law." [d. (citing E. AllAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRAcrs § 12.8,
at 839-40 (1982». Maryland applies this type of balancing to determine
whether a tort plaintiff may receive recovery for purely economic losses. See
infra notes 373, 439.
See East River S.S. Carp., 476 U.S. at 870-71. The Court recognized the many arguments for not differentiating between economic losses and those that result
in personal injury or property damage to other property. See id. at 868-69
(noting that multiple courts have concluded that treating purely economic
losses differently would generate arbitrary results that are not necessarily consistent with the principles underlying products liability law). Nonetheless, the
Court found the arguments in favor of a distinction to be "more powerful."
[d. at 870.
See id. at 872.
[d. at 871 & n.6. The East River Court noted that it did not reach the issue of
whether an action in tort could ever be asserted in admiralty if the damages
are purely economic. See id.
[d. at 871.
[d. at 866 (citing Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 149 (Cal. 1965».
[d.
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purely economic losses in tort as insurable events for which no special protection was required. 312
The Court likewise noted the economic impact of permitting
parties to recover for damages solely to the product itself,3J3 observing: "The increased cost to the public that would result from holding a manufacturer liable in tort for i~ury to a product itself -is not
justified. "314 The East River Court averted any recovery in the ship
charterer's tort action and concluded that the cause of action more
properly belonged under a warranty daim,315 absent any personal
injury or damage to "other property. "316 Observing that "the contractual responsibilities were thus clearly laid out," the East River
Court refused to "extricate the parties from their bargain"317 as the
'~maintenance of product value and quality is precisely the purpose
of express and implied warranties."318
Even though the petitioners attempted to recover for damages
to other parts of the supertankers caused by the defective steam
plants, the Court precluded recovery.319 The Supreme Court explained that the component failures of the supertankers' steam
plants, which damaged only the engines themselves and only caused
economic losses, did not rise to the level or type of danger for
which products liability was meant to compensate. 320 The Court reasoned that as " 'all but the very simplest of machines have compo312. See id. at 871-72.
313. See id. at 874. "In products-liability law, where there is a duty to the public
generally, foreseeability is an inadequate brake. Permitting recovery for all
. foreseeable claims for purely economic loss could make a manufacturer liable
for vast sums." [d. (citations omitted).
314. [d. at 872 (citation omitted).
315. If the claims had been contractually based upon warranty, the East River Court
noted that admiralty jurisdiction would not be applicable and state law would
supply the rule of decision. See id. at 872 & n.7. See also supra notes 252-59 and
accompanying text.
316. The East River Court considered "other property" to mean property damaged
by the product other than damage to the product itself. See East River S.S.
Carp., 476 U.S. at 867. In East River, the turbines only damaged themselves. See
id. at 875. On the count alleging the "reverse installation of the astern guardian valve," the Supreme Court observed similarly that "the only harm was to
the propulsion system itself rather than to persons or other property." [d. at
875-76. Thus, these economic losses fell outside the zone of recovery under
the economic loss rule. See id. at 876.
317. [d. at 875.
318. /d. at 872.
319. See id. at 867-68.
320. See id. at 867.
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nent parts, [a contrary] holding would require a finding of "property damage" in virtually every case where a product damages
itself.' "321

C. East River Doctrine Modified by the Supreme Court in Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co.
In Saratoga Fishing Co. v. JM. Martinac & CO.,322 the Supreme
Court modified East River's preclusion of recovery for economic
losses by holding that the doctrine does not extend to physical damage to other property on a vessel added after its initial sale.323 Here,
the M/V Saratoga sank as a result of an engine room fire and subsequent flooding. 324 This fishing vessel was built by J.M. Martinac and
Company fifteen years earlier and was originally equipped with a hydraulic system placed in the engine room that was designed by
Marco Seattle but installed by the shipbuilder. 325 Mter the launching
and sale to Joseph Madruga, the M/V Saratoga was outfitted with additional equipment used for the tuna fishing industry.326 Three years
later, the vessel was sold to the Saratoga Fishing Company, which
continued to use it in the tuna industry until it sank in 1987.327 At
trial, the Saratoga Fishing Company received damages for the additional equipment added by the original purchaser. 328
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed the trial court, refusing to uphold the award of
purely economic damages. 329 According to the intermediate court,
321. Id. (quoting Northern Power & Eng. Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d
324, 330 (Alaska 1981». Whether other property was meant to apply to the
whole vessel or a component not manufactured by the defendant was not
clearly delineated. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
faced this issue in Shipco 2295, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 825 F.2d 925
(5th Cir. 1987). Here, buyers of defective vessels sought to recover economic
damages from the designer of the steering mechanism for damages to components parts unrelated to the steering mechanism. See id. at 929. The court
concluded that allowing buyers to recover under the "other property" exception under these circumstances would undermine East River and specifically
defined "product" as the entire vessel. See id. at 929-30.
322. 520 U.S. 875 (1997).
323. See id. at 884.
324. Id. at 877.
325. See id.
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. See id. at 877-78.
329. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. Marco Seattle Inc., 69 F.3d 1432, 1145 (9th Cir. 1995),
rev'd, 520 U.S. 875.
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added equipment "was part of the ship when [the original purchaser] sold the ship to Saratoga Fishing, and, for that reason, . . .
the added equipment was part of the defective product that itself
caused the harm."33o The court's holding was over the objections of
a lone dissenter who argued that the additional equipment constituted "other property" under East Riv(ff.331
Subsequently agreeing with the dissenting judge, the Supreme
Court explained that East Riv(ff doctrine was inapplicable in cases
where damage was to the property added after a subsequent sale
that was not a causal factor in the injury.332 The Court was troubled
by the Ninth Circuit's holding333 that "create[d] a tort damage immunity beyond that set by any relevant tort precedent ... found."334
The Supreme Court agreed with the dissenting judge of the Ninth
Circuit that this was an unwarranted extension of East Riv(ff that created more confusion regarding the economic loss doctrine's limits,
particularly where the equipment added to the ship was not part of
the benefit of the bargain in the original sale. 335
The underlying facts of Saratoga may have suggested to the Supreme Court that a more liberal and equitable view of the East RiV(ff
doctrine was required. 336 The Saratoga Court recognized that new
owners of a vessel would in all probability alter it with new property,
which should not be construed as the product itself if it were not
part of the reason for the loss.337

330. Saratoga Fishing Co., 520 U.S. at 878.
331. See Saratoga Fishing Co., 69 F.3d at 1447 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
332. See Saratoga Fishing Co., 520 U.S. at 884-85. According to the Saratoga Court:
We conclude that equipment added to a product after the Manufacturer (or distributor selling in the initial distribution chain) has sold
the product to an initial User is not part of the product that itself
caused physical harm. Rather, in East River's language, it is "other
property." (We are speaking, of course, of added equipment that itself played no causal role in the accident that caused the physical
harm.).
[d.
333. See Saratoga Fishing Co., 69 F.3d at 1445 (holding that "the skiff, net, fuel, spare
parts, and miscellaneous equipment, those items are part of the product and
are not recoverable in a tort action as 'other property' H), rev'd, 520 U.S. 875
(1997).
334. Saratoga Fishing Co., 520 U.S. at 880.
335. See id. at 879; Saratoga Fishing Co., 69 F.3d at 1447 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
336. See Saratoga Fishing Co., 520 U.S. at 884-85.
337. See id.
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VII. EAST RIVER DOCTRINE APPLIED WITH CONTRARY RESULTS IN MARYLAND'S FEDERAL COURT
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland
has experienced some difficulty applying the harsh mandate of East
River. 338 The following two cases, decided in Maryland's federal
court, exemplify the confusion over the East River economic loss
rule as their legal conclusions directly controvert each other.339
A. Sherman v. Johnson & Towers Baltimore, Inc.

In Sherman v. Johnson & Towers Baltimore, Inc.,340 David and Theresa Sherman sought recovery under various tort and contract
causes of action against a yacht seller, Ocean Yachts, and other defendants. 341 One of the boat's main engines caught fire while offshore of Ocean City, Maryland. 342 Unable to extinguish the fire, Mr.
Sherman abandoned the burning vessel, which ultimately sank, and
was rescued. 343 Fortunately, he was uninjured. 344 In response to the
plaintiffs' tort-based claims, the seller of the yacht raised the East
River doctrine. 345
The plaintiffs attempted to avoid the preclusive economic loss
rule with two arguments, both of which the court accepted. The
Shermans distinguished their relationship with the yacht seller from
the commercial relationship in East River. 346 Unlike the parties in
East River, who had a ship-builder / ship-owner relationship, the
plaintiffs argued that they had a consumer-producer connection
with Ocean Yachts and therefore, were not precluded from recovery
338. See Shennan v. Johnson & Towers Baltimore, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 499, 501'{)2 (D.
Md. 1990) (awarding economic loss damages for a recreational vessel lost as a
result of fire in a products liability action). But see Reliance Ins. Co. v. Carver
Boat Corp., No. 96-194, 1997 WL 714900, *24 (D. Md. May 29, 1997) (denying
a marine products liability claim for economic losses occasioned by fire to a
recreational vessel).
339. See infra Part VI.
340. 760 F. Supp. 499 (D. Md. 1990).
341. See id. at 501'{)2. The count for breach of warranty claims survived motion to
dismiss. See id. at 501.
342. See id. at 500.
343. See id.
344. See id. Had Mr. Shennan been injured, he may have recovered his purely economic losses sustained from the sinking of the yacht. See 1 DUNN, supra note
265, § 3.7, at 204 (observing that the existence of even slight physical injury
may pennit recovery and discussing several cases with "extreme" results).
345. See id. at 501.
346. See id. at 501'{)2.
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of economic losses by the East River doctrine. 347 The federal district
court found East River inapplicable to the facts in Sherman on this
basis. 348
The Sherman court noted that because the East River Court
found no need to intrude into the commercial parties' choice to
risk shift, it drew a distinction between the consumer (non-commercial) purchasers and a commercial seller. 349 The Sherman court relied on the repeated references by the East River Court to the commercial context to conclude that its rule of preclusion applied solely
to commercial transactions. 35o Although noting that the Supreme
Court "did not define 'commercial relationship' ", the Sherman
court nonetheless concluded that the East River Court had "set out
some characteristics of such a relationship. "351 Considering the nature of the transaction, the court refused to define the Shermans'
transaction with Ocean Yachts as commercial.352
347.
348.
349.
350.

See id. at 502.
See id.
See id. at 502.
See id. at 501. As noted by the Sherman court, the East River Court addressed
the issue of " 'whether a commercial product injuring itself is the kind of hann
against which public policy requires manufacturers to protect, independent of
any contractual obligation.' " !d. at sal (quoting East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S.
at 866) (emphasis added). Also noted by the Sherman court was the East River
Court's holding that, "a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no
duty" under negligence or strict liability to "prevent a product from injuring
itself." fd. (quoting East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 871) (emphasis added). In
support of its holding, the Sherman court also referenced a footnote in which
the East River Court refused to "eliminate all tort causes of action when the
only damages sought are economic." fd. (citing East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S.
at 871 n.6). This was certainly a reasonable interpretation of East River given
the Court's clear analysis of a problematic commercial transaction and the
Court's express language in its holding. See also East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S.
at 871-76.
351. Sherman, 760 F. Supp. at 501. For example, while discussing tort safety concerns and product injury, the East River Court stated:
[When] a product injuries itself, the commercial user stands to lose the
value of the product, risks the displeasure of its customers who find
that the product does not meet their needs, or as in [East River
Steamship's case, experiences increased costs in performing a service . ..
[l] osses like these can be insured.
fd. at 501'{)2 (quoting East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476
U.S. 858, 871-72 (1986».
352. See id. at 502. The Sherman court also relied on the conclusion of some courts
and commentators that the East River doctrine does not apply in the noncommercial context and the failure of the defendant to produce a case in
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The second argument turned on the definition of other property loss-the East River doctrine only precludes recovery for economic losses to the product itself, that is the vessel, in tort.353 The
Shermans argued that the "other property" that they had added to
their vessel and lost as a result of the fire and sinking should be recoverable in tort. 354 The court agreed with the Shermans' view, concluding "that the economic damage went beyond the product itself
and included 'other property,' specifically, various items of personal
property ... [that were] not components of the yacht" and denied
the defendant's motion to dismiss. 355 Thus, the Shermans were able
to avoid the East River economic loss rule on that ground as well. 356
B. Reliance Insurance Co. v. Carver Boat Corp.
In Reliance Insurance Co. v. Carver Boat Corp.,357 an unreported
opinion, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland sitting in admiralty came to a very different conclusion in its
second opportunity to apply the East River economic loss rule. 358
The plaintiff insurance company sought subrogation after paying an
insurance claim stemming from the loss of a recreational vesseP59
The yacht burned because of an electrical failure while the vessel
was berthed at a marina. 360 In the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, the issue was again whether the East River doctrine applied in a non-commercial context. 361 Relying on Sherman, the plain-

353.

354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

which the doctrine was applied to a claim for economic damages arising from
a non-commercial relationship. See id. (citations omitted).
See id. at 501-02. If Saratoga Fishing Co. v. JM. Martinac & Co. had been decided before the Shermans sued, it would have not compelled a different result; the Sherman court's decision presaged Saratoga's subsequent holding that
allowed recovery of other property losses. See Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875 (1997). For a discussion of Saratoga Fishing Co., see
supra Part VI.C.
See Shennan, 760 F. Supp. at 501.
See id.
Id. at 502.
No. 96-194, 1997 WL 714900 (D. Md. May 29, 1997).
See id. at *1.
See id.
See id. at *1, *3.
See id. at *1 & n.l. The Reliance Insurance Co. court noted that the Sherman
commercial/noncommercial vessel distinction was predicated on cases that
"were all decided in the context of commercial transactions." Id. (citing Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Suwanee River Spa Lines, 866 F.2d 752 (5th Cir.
1989) (barring recovery under the economic loss rule for a suit by the owner
of a sunken tugboat against the vessel's builder and supervisor of construction
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tiffs argued that the court should again limit the East River doctrine
to commercial users.362 Writing for the federal district court in Reliance Insurance Co., Judge Nickerson candidly observed that since his
decision in Sherman, "the law has obviously evolved in a manner not
anticipated by this [Court] at the time it rendered its decision."363
Therefore, the Reliance Insurance Co. court refused to regenerate the
Sherman holding to distinguish between non-commercial and commercial buyers of marine products. 364 Nevertheless, as Reliance Insurance Co. is an unreported decision, it binds only the parties to the
action, and has no precedential value for other cases. 365
The court's decision to forgo the distinction between commercial and non-commercial users of a maritime product was founded
upon two disarmingly simple precepts. First, according to the court,
the ability of consumers to purchase insurance to protect against
the risk of vessel loss mitigates the need for a distinction. 366 Second,
the court saw little difference between commercial users of a
marine product and sophisticated recreational vessel owners.367 Although sellers and consumers are not ordinarily considered to be
bargaining equals, unlike the parties in a commercial transaction,

362.
363.
364.
365.

366.

367.

of the integrated tug and barge unit); Richard O'Brien Cos. v. Challenge
Cook Bros., 672 F. Supp. 466 (D. Colo. 1987) (addressing a non-maritime case
in which the owner of cement pumps sought recovery for economic loss);
Consumers Power Co. v. Mississippi Valley Structural Steel Co., 636 F. Supp.
1100 (E. Mich. 1986) (considering the claims of an owner and builder of nuclear power plant for economic losses incurred because of a reactor's defective anchor bolts».
See Reliance Ins. Co., 1997 WL 714900 at *1.
!d. at *2; see also Karshan v. Mattituck Inlet Marina & Shipyard, Inc., 785 F.
Supp. 363, 366 (E.D. N.Y 1992).
See Reliance Ins. Co., 1997 WL 714900, at *1, *3.
See FED. R i\pP. P. 36(c) ("Citation of this Court's unpublished dispositions in
briefs and oral arguments in this Court and in the district courts within this
Circuit is disfavored, except for the purpose of establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of. the case."). In Maryland state courts, an unreported opinion is neither binding precedent nor persuasive authority. See MD. RULE 8114(a).
See Reliance Ins. Co., 1997 WL 714900, at *2 (noting that the East River Court
"focused on the availability of insurance-and non-commercial vessels are also
usually insured") (citing Karshan, 785 F. Supp. at 366; Sisson v. Hatteras
Yachts, Inc., No. 87-C0652, 1991 WL 47543, *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 1991»; see also
1 PARKS, supra note 7, at 3 ("[The] importance [of] insurance in maritime affairs cannot be overemphasized. Without exception, it pervades every single
sphere of maritime activities and, absent marine insurance protection, maritime commerce could come to a standstill.").
See Reliance Ins. Co., 1997 WL 714900, at *2.
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the Reliance Insurance Co. court concluded that most federal courts
that had considered the issue "discard[ed] the commercial/noncommercial distinction as useless and likely to lead to confusion. "368
The Reliance Insurance Co. court also considered and explicitly
rejected the plaintiff's argument that even if the East River rule applied, the exception to the economic loss rule fashioned by the Maryland Court of Appeals should be applied. 369 Maryland's economic
loss rule exception370 distinctly differs from the East River doctrine. 371
368. Id. (quoting Somerset Marine Inc. v. Forespar Prods. Corp., 876 F. Supp. 1114,
1115 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (citing Sisson, 1991 WL 47543, at *2 (addressing an admiralty claim for a vessel that sank in Indiana waters due to a defective
onboard washer/dryer unit»); Karshan, 785 F. Supp. at 365-66; Lewinter v.
Genmar Indus., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 305, 308-09 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (considering
a catastrophic hull failure from defective fiberglass hull delamination». The
court also relied on the decision of the Washington Supreme Court in Stanton
v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 866 P.2d 15 (Wash. 1993). Judge Nickerson observed
that the Stanton court echoed the admiralty principle of uniformity-traditional maritime law does not differentiate based on the commercial or noncommercial nature of an activity. See Reliance Ins. Co., 1997 WL 714900, at *2
(citing Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 675-76 (1982».
369. See Reliance Ins. Co., 1997 WL 714900, *3.
370. See Milton Co. v. Council of Unit Owners of Bentley Place Condominium, 121
Md. App. 100, 708 A.2d 1047 (1998), aff'd, 354 Md. 264, 729 A.2d 981 (1999).
Although recognizing that plaintiffs ordinarily do not recover for purely economic losses in tort, the court of special appeals recently recounted:
The Court of Appeals has held, however, that a plaintiff may recover
in tort for purely economic loss where the defect creates a substantial
and unreasonable risk of death or personal injury. . . . Moreover,
when parties to a negligence action share an "intimate nexus," satisfied by "privity of contract or its equivalent," recovery in negligence
may be had for "economic loss," despite the absence of any risk that
personal injury will result: "Where the failure to exercise due care
creates a risk of economic loss only, courts have generally required
an intimate nexus between the parties as a condition to the imposition of tort liability. This intimate nexus satisfied by contractual privity or its equivalent. By contrast, where the risk created is one of personal injury, no such direct relationship need be shown, and the
principal determinate of duty becomes foreseeability."
Id. at 115-16, 708 A.2d at 1054 (quoting Jacques v. First National Bank, 307
Md. 527, 534-35, 515 A.2d 756 (1986». For a thorough treatment of Maryland's stance on tort recovery of economic loss, see generally Michael R. McCann, Comment, Atlantis Revisited: Recovery Under Maryland Law for Purely Earnomic Loss Against Negligent Builders and Manufacturers, 23 U. BALT. L. REv. 521
(1994). Obviously, this approach is in sharp contrast to that of the East River
Court. See supra notes 285-320 and accompanying text.
.
371. Under the East River doctrine, the federal courts may not award recovery for
purely economic losses absent personal injury or damage to other property
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However, the court, in deference to the East River rule and the requirement for consistency observed372 that "the need for uniformity
in maritime products liability law prohibits this Court from applying
Maryland's 'risk of harm' rule in this admiralty action."373
The Reliance Insurance Co. court's treatment of the East River
doctrine is arguably an ambivalent result. The court correctly declined to apply Maryland law to fashion a remedy; such a displacement would have been an affront to federal interests by violating
admiralty law's guiding principles of decisional uniformity and consistency.374 Nevertheless, this unpublished decision did not expressly
overrule the result in Sherman, although it certainly cast considerable doubt as to its continued vitality.375

VIII. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. Recovery in Other Jurisdictions
Two jurisdictions other than Maryland have also considered the
issue of whether to provide remedies under state law or under the

372.
373.
374.

o

375.

other than the product itself, whereas in Maryland, a potentiality of an unreasonable risk of hann is sufficient to allow recovery. Compare East River S.S.
Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 870 (1986), with AJ.
DeCoster Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 33 Md. 245, 251, 634 A.2d 1330
1333 (1994).
See East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 870.
See Reliance Ins. Co., 1997 WL 714900, at *3.
Unfortunately, the Yamaha Court has apparently signaled a departure from
the once fairly stringent uniformity and consistency principles of admiralty
law that ordinarily preclude recovery under state law. See Burrell, supra note
131, at 74. Yamaha "provides an excellent example of the characterization
problems that arise in recreational boating cases and of the temptation to
bend the law to the circumstances of the case." Id. at 75. Whether the Supreme Court's decision will affect other substantive areas of admiralty law is
an open question; the Yamaha Court did not address "whether federal maritime or state law should fonn the substantive law ... providing the rule of
law for remedies [for wrongful death claims and] ... and those remedies may
change when the vessel crosses the mystical three mile limit and unseen state
boundaries." Russell & Nikas; supra note 104, at 387.
See Karshan v. Mattituck Inlet Marina & Shipyard, 785 F. Supp. 363, 365 & n.2
(E.D.N.Y 1992) (disagreeing with Shennan v. Johnson & Towers Baltimore,
Inc., 760 F. Supp. 499 (D. Md. 1990»; v. Lewinter v. Genmar Indus., 32 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 305, 309 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that Sherman was the only
published case that drew a distinction between commercial and consumer vessel transactions); Alloway v. General Marine Indus., 695 A.2d 264, 270 (NJ.
1997) (characterizing Sherman as against the weight of authority); Stanton v.
Bayliner Marine Corp., 866 P.2d 15, 21-23 (Wash. 1993) (suggesting that the
continued vitality of Sherman was doubtful and observing that the Sherman decision stood alone against the weight of authority).
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general maritime law. 376 Likewise, these cases also reveal the difficulty that a court encounters in harmonizing the harsh federal rule
with a consumer-boater's need for protection from defective marine
products. 377 In Stanton v. Bayliner Manne Corp.,378 a consolidated action brought in Washington state court, the plaintiffs claimed that
their forty-five foot boats were lost because the design of the recreational vessels' keels created an unreasonable risk of mass flooding
should an accidental grounding, stranding, or a submerged object
puncture the hull. 379
The parties in Stanton vigorously disputed whether East Rivers
doctrinal mandate extended to consumers or whether it was factually limited to commercial transactions. 380 Relying on Sherman,381 the
plaintiffs contended that the economic loss rule barring recovery in
tort as applied to consumers was still undeveloped and thus, state
law could provide the appropriate remedy.382 However, after looking
to other jurisdictions' treatment of cases where yacht-owners suffered only economic losses, the court concluded that the mandate
of East River was equally suitable to both commercial and consumer
vessel transactions. 383 The Stanton court decided that the lower court
erred by displacing the East River doctrine with a remedy under
Washington state law. 384 Premised on the erroneous notion that the

376. See Stanton, 866 P.2d at 22 (declining to depart from admiralty's uniformity
principle and barring recovery for the losses of two yachts); Goldson v. Carver
Boat Corp., 707 A.2d 193, 198 (NJ. App. Ct. 1998) (barring a claim for recovery of a destroyed yacht and noting that the "substantive maritime law relating to tort recovery is abundantly clear").
377. See, e.g., Stanton v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 844 P.2d 1019, 1023 (Wash. App. Ct.
1992) (observing that the East River Court "unjustifiably dismisses the safety
concerns attendant to product injuries caused by hazardous defects."), rro'd,
866 P.2d 15 (Wash. 1993). But see Burrell, supra note 131, at 79 ("[C]are must
be taken that the balancing of national and state interests is not result-oriented... ").
378. 866 P.2d 15 (Wash. 1993).
379. See id. at 17. The plaintiffs asserted that their boat sank in 12 minutes after
striking a submerged rock in Puget Sound. See id. Bayliner maintained that
the sinking actually took 27 minutes. See id.
380. See id. at 21.
381. Sherman v. Johnson & Towers Baltimore, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 499 (D. Md.
1990).
382. See Stanton, 866 P.2d at 17.
383. See id. at 23. In addition, the Stanton court relied on Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668,674-75 (1982).
384. See Stanton, 866 P.2d at 20.
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consumer concerns were local, not maritime,385 the lower court superseded the federal interest in admiralty uniformity.386 Recognizing
that there is no distinction between pleasure boats and commercial
vessels in marine products liability cases,387 the Supreme Court of
Washington reasoned that "Washington's interest in providing a
remedy . . . does not outweigh federal interests in uniformity"388
and reversed the lower court. 389
Having decided that the East River economic loss rule would be
applicable to the plaintiffs' yacht losses, the court next examined
the issue of whether the substantive maritime law preempted Washington's risk-of-harm balancing test. 390 Reviewing the Washington
Products Liability Act391 and the legislative intent underlying its promulgation,392 the Stanton court held that tort recovery for economic
losses was specifically excluded under the Act because such claims
were warranty actions under the Uniform Commercial Code. 393 The
court's characterization of this action did not conflict with the East
River rule. 394 However, there was an inherent conflict as to the manner that economic loss was defined because Washington state law
permitted recovery utilizing a risk-of-harm balancing test395 for pure
economic losses, rather than the restrictive contract approach formulated by the East River Court. 396 The Stanton court held that there
was no recovery in tort for the plaintiffs because "federal maritime
law preempts application of a conflicting state law where there is a
judicially fashioned admiralty rule on point [and] East River is the
385. See id. (citing Stanton, 844 P.2d at 1019). Mter analyzing the harm suffered by
the plaintiffs, the lower court explained: "Whatever federal interest in uniformity exists, it is outweighed by Washington's concern to ensure the personal safety of its citizens, to deter the manufacture and dissemination of dangerous products, and to exercise its authority over tortfeasors acting within its
jurisdiction." Stanton, 844 P.2d at 1023.
386. See Stanton, 866 P.2d at 20.
387. See id. at 21-23.
388. See id. at 26.
389. Seeid. at 17.
390. See id. at 24 (citing Stanton, 844 P.2d at 1019).
39l. See id. at 18 n.2 (citing WASH. REv. CODE. §§ 7.72.010-060 (1992) (Washington's
Products Liability Act».
392. See id. at 26.
393. See id. (citing WASH. REv. CODE. §§ 7.72.010(6), 7.72.020(2) (1992».
394. See id. at 25. The Stanton court observed that "[t]he [Washington Products Liability Act] does not conflict with the holding in East River." Id.
395. See id. at 27 (citing Washington Water Power Co. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 774 P.2d
1199, 1210 (Wash. 1989».
396. See id. at 25.
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maritime rule on economic loss. "397
In a New Jersey case, the intermediate appellate court in Goldson v. Carver Boat Corp.398 also decided that the substantive remedies
provided by state law must give way to the governing general maritime law. 399 At a public sale, Goldson bought a powerboat valued at
$175,000 for $125,000 in "as is" condition. 400 Two months later, the
boat caught fire while docked at a marina. 401 After determining the
cause of the fire,402 the plaintiff filed suit and advanced theories of
negligence, strict liability, and warranty against the boat builder and
engine installer.403 The court held that tort recovery was barred because the suit was for purely economic losses to the vessel itself,404
observing that" [t]he substantive maritime law relating to tort recovery of economic loss is abundantly clear"405 and affirming the trial
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. 406
These decisions illustrate how a state court should apply the
distinctive remedies afforded under the general maritime law as
uniformity principles promote decisional consistency.407 There are
only a few reasons why a state court should apply its own remedy
rather than the governing substantive rule of admiralty:408 (1) the
absence of any guiding admiralty principle,409 (2) the use of state
law would merely impact a predominately local concern,410 or (3)
the use of state law to supplement an inadequate rule provided by
397.
. 398.
399.
400.
401.

402.

403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.

[d. at 28 .
707 A.2d 193 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).
See id. at 198, 20l.
See id. at 194.
See id. at 194-95. Mter completing a "long hard run," the plaintiff docked the
boat. [d. While the vessel had performed well during transit, the boat owner
observed that a spark emanated from the engine compartment shortly after
docking. See id. Mter opening the hatch, the boat caught on fire and was severely damaged. See id. at 195.
See id. at 195. The plaintiff's expert determined the cause of the fire and loss
of the boat was "the improper installation of the [boat's] engine and its proximity to the decking." [d.
See id.
See id. at 198.
[d.
See id.
See Maryland Dep't of Nat. Resources v. Kellum, 51 F.3d 1220, 1226 (4th Cir.
1995).
See Burrell, supra note 131, at 65.
See id.
See id.
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the substantive admiralty law. 411 Although few state courts have faced
this issue, they would likely follow the Stanton and Goldson decisions
by adhering to federal admiralty precedents. 412 However, one state
supreme court has been "relatively bold in asserting the applicability of state law in maritime cases. "413
In Green v. Industrial Helicopters, Inc.,414 the Supreme Court of
Louisiana extended the "maritime but local concern" doctrine,
which had been historically grounded in workers compensation
cases,415 to strict liability.416 "As a matter of logic and legally permissible principle [,]" the state's highest court asserted that it could "afford a remedy not traditionally found in the maritime law, provided
that the remedy neither conflicts with substantive maritime law nor
impermissibly interferes with the requirement of uniformity."417 Because Green dealt with personal injuries sustained during the crash
landing of a helicopter into the Gulf of Mexico approximately 150
miles offshore of the Louisiana coast,418 the facts fell into an interstitial space between substantive maritime law and applicable state
law. 419 Therefore, the supreme court permitted the plaintiff to recover under the state strict liability statute420 as a supplement to the
general maritime law, which provided no clear remedy.421
Relying on Green, Louisiana's lower courts have extended Green

411. See id.
412. See Stanton v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 866 P.2d 15, 25 (Wash. 1993). But see
Green v. Industrial Helicopters, Inc., 593 So. 2d 634, 638-39 (La. 1992) (holding that predominately local interests mandated application of state law instead of substantive maritime law). See also Burrell, supra note 131, at 69 (noting that even where "local elements predominate," the use of this principle to
apply a state law remedy "may be extremely disruptive to uniformity because
they can be used as authority in subsequent cases to work harm to established
maritime rules.").
413. Robertson, supra note 82, at 703 (citing Green, 593 So. 2d at 638-39).
414. 593 So. 2d 634, 636 (La. 1992), em. denied, 506 U.S. 819 (1992).
415. See CALIFORNIA PLEASURE BOATING LAw, supra note 136, at 336 ("Most of the
case law on the 'maritime but local' doctrine arose out of attempts to apply
workmen's compensation statutes to maritime employment."). According to
one writer, even though "[t]hese cases are instructive[,] they are of limited direct application to pleasure boating enthusiasts." Id.
416. See Green, 593 So. 2d at 643-44.
417. Id. at 639.
418. See id. at 635-36.
419. See id. at 64142.
420. See id. at 636 (citing LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2317).
421. See id.
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to encompass marine products liability claims,422 although none
have yet reached a case-with only economic losses. By permitting recovery under its state strict liability statute, Louisiana and its state
courts are disregarding the East River mandate. While distinguishable on its facts from Sherman and Reliance Insurance Co., these Louisiana cases could form the basis for an unwarranted and potentially
harmful variance in admiralty law's uniformity principle.423
B. Recovery in Marylt;md's Courts

The contradictory signals sent by the. Maryland federal courts
are not surprising. The Sherman court's result conforms with the
plain language in East River, which clearly referred to the armslength transaction of sophisticated shipbuilders, shipowners, and
charter parties. 424 Whether the East River Court enVisioned that its
mandate would preclude recreational vessel consumers from recovering purely economic losses is debatable. 425 This is particularly true
in light of the Court's subsequent modification of East River in Saratoga-yet another case involving a sophisticated shipbuilder and experienced fishing vessel owners.426 Therefore, the Saratoga Court's
reasoning arguably did not reach consumer recreational vessel
transactions either. 427
On the other hand, there is ample authority to refrain from
making a distinction between commercial and noncommercial ves422. See Brodtmann v. Duke, 708 So. 2d 447, 452 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (considering
the death of three passengers on a 37 foot cabin cruiser stemming from carbon monoxide emitted from a corroded marine generator exhaust); Zeller v.
Olympic Marine Co., 692 So. 2d lIn, 1I75 (La. App. Ct. 1997) (addressing
an injury caused by a defective barge loading system where wire line caught
cleat on barge and snapped, but providing no recovery under either state or
admiralty' law); Mayo v. Nissan Motor Corp., 639 So. 2d 773, 784-85 (La. App.
Ct. 1994) (involving a failure to warn and holding that state law could supplement East River).
423. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
424. See supra notes 351-57 and accompanying text. Judge Nickerson's analysis was
not followed by any other court, despite the readily distinguishable difference
between the vessel's charterers in East River and the yacht owners in Sherman.
See Karshan v. Mattituck Inlet Marina & Shipyard, 785 F. Supp. 363, 365 (E.D.
N.Y. 1992).
425. The express language of the East River Court's holding referred to commercial
users and did not mention recreational vessels at all. See supra text accompanying note 307.
426. See Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 877 (1997).
427. See id. at 883.
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selS. 428 Even in the determination of subject matter jurisdiction, one
of the most fundamental determinations in the evaluation of a maritime claim, all courts in admiralty must disregard distinctions based
on the vessel's use. 429 Moreover, the East River Court's rationale that
dissatisfaction with a commercial vessel and the corresponding reduction of any benefit of the bargain is best understood as a warranty claim430 applies with equal force to consumers of recreational
vessels. 431 Therefore, the Reliance Insurance Co. court properly refused to excuse the parties from their bargain because "litde distinguishes a commercial purchaser of a maritime vessel from a consumer, [as] pleasure boat purchasers [generally] are sophisticated
and perfectly capable of negotiating the terms of the [ir] vessel
purchase. "432
The consequences of applying the East River doctrine can be
harsh, considering the protections afforded under state law. Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was adopted by the Maryland
Court of Appeals to protect consumers from the unreasonable risk
428. See Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674-75 (1982) ("The federal
interest in protecting maritime commerce cannot be adequately served if admiralty jurisdiction is restricted to those individuals actually engaged in commercial maritime activity. ").
429. See supra notes 14146 and accompanying text.
430. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 872-74
(1986) .
431. See Karshan v. Mattituck Inlet Marina & Shipyard, 785 F. Supp. 363, 365-66
(E.D.N.Y 1992). The Karshan court reasoned that the East River Court did not
limit its rationale to purely commercial transactions. See id. The court also
quoted East River for the proposition that claims of this type should fall under
warranty rather than tort. See id. at 366 (quoting East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S.
at 866-68); see also Lewinter v. Genmar Indus., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 305, 309 n.3
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (tracing the rationale of East River and observing with approval that a warranty remedy is appropriate). But see Alloway v. General
Marine Indus., 695 A.2d 264, 272-73 (NJ. 1997). The Alloway court put an interesting limitation on its preclusion of economic recovery for tort and strict
liability claims under state law: "[W]e do not reach the issue of the preclusion
of a strict-liability claim when the parties are of unequal bargaining power, the
product is a necessity, no alternative source for the product is readily available,
and the purchaser cannot reasonably insure against consequential damages."
Alloway, 695 A.2d at 273. (emphasis added). Although the Alloway court precluded recovery of purely economic losses on the specific facts in dispute, it
did leave the door open to considering whether purely economic damages to
other types of vessels, such as work boats or commercial fishing vessels, could
be recovered.
432. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Carver Boat Corp., No. 96-194, 1997 WL 714900, at *2 (D.
Md. May 29, 1997).
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of harm caused by defective products. 433 Maryland courts also permit plaintiffs to recover for economic losses where the mere potential of serious personal injury exists. 434 However, if a purely economic loss claim is heard in a Maryland court applying admiralty
law, East Rivers economic loss rule and admiralty's principles may
inflict severe penalties against a Maryland boater who purchases an
expensive, but defective, yacht that causes no harm other than to
the vessel itself. 435
Admittedly, the principles of uniformity and consistency in admiralty adversely affect the rights of consumers who have far less experience in owning and operating their vessel than commercial vessel owners. Laypersons may lack the ability to knowingly risk shift
433. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp. 278 Md. 337, 352-53, 363 A.2d 955, 963
(1976) (adopting section 402A); see also Awsumb, supra note 247, at 3.
434. See Council of Co-Owners Atl. Condominium v. Whiting-Turner Contracting
Co., 308 Md. 18, 35, 517 A.2d 336, 345 (1986).
435. See Reliance Ins. Co., 1997 WL 714900, at *3; see also Stanton v. Bayliner Marine
Corp., 866 P.2d 15, 22 (Wash. 1993) (declining to depart from admiralty'S uniformity principle and disallowing any tort recovery for economic losses that
might have been available under state law). But see Boatel Indus., Inc. v. Hester, 77 Md. App. 284, 550 A.2d 389 (1988). In Boate~ a non-admiralty action
for breach of warranty and the tort of negligent misrepresentation was
brought in Maryland state court to recover for a yacht'S hull failure during
rough weather on the Chesapeake Bay. See id. at 289, 550 A.2d at 392. The
Boatel court reversed the trial court's award of economic loss damages. See id.
Deciding that the plaintiffs were not consumers, the court limited the remedy
to repair costs. See id. at 296, 550 A.2d at 395. As reasoned by the Boatel court:
"Because the Hesters suffered no physical injuries, their alleged damages being entirely economic losses, it would appear that they are likewise precluded
from recovery for common law negligent misrepresentation." Id. at 307, 550
A.2d at 401 (citing Flow Indus. v. Fields Const. Co., 683 F. Supp. 527,530 (D.
Md. 1988); Wood Prods., Inc. v. CMI Corp., 651 F. Supp. 641 (D. Md. 1986);
Copiers Typewriters Calculators v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F. Supp. 312 (D. Md.
1983». At least to the extent of the tort claim for negligent misrepresentation, it appears that "the determination of whether a duty will be imposed in
this type of case should depend upon the risk generated by the negligent con-.
duct, rather than upon the fortuitous circumstance of the nature of the resultant damage." Id. at 308, 550 A.2d at 401 (citing Council of Co-Owners v.
Whiting-Turner, 308 Md. 18,35,517 A.2d 336, 345 (1986». Once the duty of
the defendant is established, "[ w] here the risk is of death or personal injury
the action will lie for recovery of the reasonable cost of correcting the dangerous condition." Id. The Boatel court did not need to decide this case on
the basis of the East River doctrine because recovery for economic losses was
precluded by strict application of state limited warranty law. See id. Had this
dispute been litigated under a maritime products liability theory, the East
River doctrine should have also barred a tort recovery.
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liabilities436 or appreciate the complexity of the forces at work dur436. Of course, insurance is available to recreational vessel owners to protect themselves from potential liabilities. See Karshan v. Mattituck Inlet Marina & Shipyard, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 363, 366 (E.D. N.V. 1992) ("[V]essel owners can, and
generally do, insure against losses to the value of the vessel. . . ." (citing East
River S.S. Corp., v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 871 (1986». The
discrepancy lies where a knowledgeable vessel owner, such as a shipping company, has the power to negotiate equally with the vessel's builder and component suppliers to favorably warranty their products, whereas a recreational vessel owner may not have the bargaining power. See infra note 443.
These differences also extend to the construction of the vessel and its subsequent use. Commercial vessels are usually built under the practiced eye of a
classification society, such as the American Bureau of Shipping, and assembled with component parts inspected and certified by the Bureau. See Matter
of Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz off the Coast of France on March 16, 1978,
954 F.2d 1279, 1286 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Machael A. Miller, Liability of Classification Societies from the Perspective of United States Law, 22 TUL. MAR. LJ. 75, 8288 (1997); ELIJAH BAKER. INTRODUCTION TO STEEL SHIPBUILDING 10-11 (2d ed.
1953).
Also, commercial vessels are generally operated by a licensed master who is
assisted by a crew and officers that are explicitly required to obey the master's
lawful commands. See 46 U.S.C. § 11,501(4) (1996) (enumerating penalties to
be imposed on seamen for the willful disobedience of a lawful command at
sea); Maes v. Los Angeles Tanker Operators, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 7, 8-10 (S.D.
Tex. 1948) (rejecting a claim against a shipowner and vessel for false imprisonment after the master confined the chief mate to his quarters and indicating that the chief mate's employment contract required him to obey all lawful
commands of the officer in charge of the ship). In addition, the vessel operation, manning requirements, safety inspections, and repair schedules of commercial vessels are heavily regulated. See also Western Pioneer, Inc. v. United
States, 709 F.2d 1331, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1983).
Conversely, recreational craft are often built in mass production facilities
and sold to dealers for resale to consumers, much like the automobile industry. See Complaint of Dillahey, 733 F. Supp. 874, 879 (D.NJ. 1990); see also
CHAPMfu'l, supra note 59, at 551. Frustrated at the ability of yacht owners to petition for exoneration from liability in what they plainly viewed as an action
limited to commercial vessels, the Dillahey court observed: "Pleasure boating
is . . . the product of a technology that can produce small boats at modest
cost and of an economy that puts such craft within the means of almost everyone." Dillahey, 733 F. Supp. at 879 (quoting Preble Stolz, Pleasure Boating and
Admiralty: Erie at Sea, 51 CAL. L. REv. 661, 661 (1963». Indeed, "[i]n 1995
alone. recreational vessel sales reached more than 326,600 new units." Russell
& Nikas. supra note 104, at 382 & n.1 (citing Marine Industry Recovery to
Continue, CIT MARINE INDUSTRY OUTLOOK, June 25, 1996, at 1). Often times,
the recreational vessel purchaser may be totally unfamiliar with maritime affairs and rely on the dealer to provide information, warranty service, operating expertise, and perhaps even their first boat rides. See, e.g., Karshan, 785 F.
Supp. at 365-{56.
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ing a sojourn at sea, both natural437 and man-made. 438 Furthermore,
recreational vessel retailers and buyers may not have equal bargaining power in their transactions. 439 Nonetheless, even if pleaded, the
Maryland courts should not distinguish between consumers who
purchase recreational boats and owners of commercial vessels. 440
Any consumer/commercial or similar bargaining power-based distinction for maritime products liability claims entailing only economic losses should come from Congress,441 either by explicit pre-

437. See DONALD A WHELPLEY, WEATHER, WATER AND BOATING at vii (1961). According to one commentator:
The sailor cannot escape from the elements, neither can he ignore
weather, be it good, bad, or indifferent, because it surrounds him
from the time he casts off until he bends on the last line at the dock
and secures. Skippers of rowboats and . . . ships share many of the
same weather problems, even if on a different scale.
Id.
438. See UNITED STATES POWER SQUADRONS, MARINE ENGINES AND EQUIPMENT at iii
(1972) ("An engine failure at the wrong time could well mean the 'death' of
your boat and, more important, [the boat operator's] life may end up as a
statistic in the. ever-increasing list of small boat casualties.").
439. See Reliance Ins. Co., 1997 WL 714900 at *2. But see Karshan, 785 F. Supp. at
365 (observing that the purchase of a $480,000 yacht by a sophisticated buyer
does not transform the relationship from consumer to commercial); Alloway
v. General Maritime Indus., 695 A.2d 264, 276 (NJ. 1997) (Handler, J., concurring) ("The consumer here is a purchaser of an expensive luxury whose
bargaining power is substantially equivalent to that of the seller.").
440. Cf. Alloway, 695 A.2d at 272-75 (explainIng that the remedy for economic loss
should lie in warranty because a "tort cause of action for economic loss duplicating the one provided by the U.C.C. is superfluous and counterproductive").
441. See Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the Proper Federal Role of American Tort Law, 38
ARIz. L. REv. 917, 942 (1996) ("While at the state level products liability law-at
least until recently-has primarily been judicial law, at the federal level products liability law would presumably be law adopted by Congress."); see also Stephen J. Werber, The Constitutional Dimensirm of a National Products Liability of
Repose, 40 VILL. L. REv. 985, 1003 (1995) ("Congress can act in the area of
products liability and can preempt state law."); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2;
id. art. I, § 8, d. 3. Congress has considered and passed legislation dealing
with a number of federal products liability issues. See Werber, supra, at 1003.
Additionally, federal regulatory agencies have promulgated many product
safety standards. See Richard C. Ausness, The Case for a "Strong" Regulatory Compliance Defense, 55 MD. L. REV. 1210, 1214-17 (1996) (observing that
"[p]roducts liability is a mixture of state tort law and federal regulation") (citing Paul Dueffert, Note, The Role of Regulatory Compliance in Tort Actions, 26
HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 175, 177 (1989».

490

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 28

emption442 or by enabling legislation for federal regulatory action,443
not the courts.
This may be especially necessary in light of the recent calls for
recreational-vessel propeller guards 444 and the ever-increasing importance of marine design defect and failure to warn cases to admiralty
law. 445 Considering the strength of consumer pressure and the
power of recreational boating's user associations,446 the time may be
442. See Ausness, supra note 441, at 1266 (suggesting that one solution is for "Congress or federal administrative agencies [to] preempt state products liability
law explicitly").
443. See id.
444. See Propeller Accidents Involving Houseboats and Other Displacement Type
Recreational Vessels, 60 Fed. Reg. 25,191 (May 11, 1995) (to be codified at 33
C.F.R. § 183) (seeking comments to determine what action may be necessary
to address propeller accidents involving houseboats and other displacementtype recreational vessels). In a study to develop the background to support a
federal regulation that would require propeller guards on houseboats, it was
found that:
Over 31,000 boating accidents were reported to the Coast Guard for
the years 1989 to 1993. The BAR [Boating Accident Report] data
base indicates that 17 'Struck By Boat or Propeller' accidents involving houseboats were reported, with 16 injuries and one fatality. Three
accidents resulting in three injuries were of the category, 'Struck by
Boat,' and 14 were of the category, 'Struck by Propeller,' and n:suited in 13 injuries and one fatality.
Id. The United States Coast Guard maintains that "[c]urrently availabl~ data
does not support a need for Federal regulations to require propeller guards
on houseboats." Id. After extending the comment period, the Coast Guard received 1,994 responses to this notice seeking comments. See Propeller Injury
Prevention Aboard Rental Boats, 61 Fed. Reg. 13,123 (1996) (to be codified at
33 C.F.R. § 183). More than 1,800 of the comments received "were form letters from individuals who support the development of regulations to require
the use of propeller guard technology or pump jet propulsion on vessels used
in the rental houseboat industry." Id. at 13,124. The Coast Guard further
noted that
[a]n additional 69 comments supporting the development of regulations to prevent the incidence of propeller-strike accidents were received from accident victims and their relatives, attorneys, physicians,
State law enforcement agencies, manufacturers of devices designed to
prevent propeller-strike accidents, and other individuals. Comments
opposing regulations were received from 57 boaters, nine houseboat
livery operators and marinas, members of 10 associations, committees, or councils, 13 boat and engine manufacturers, and [6] naval
architects or marine consultants.
Id.
445. See Nixon, supra note 243, at 244-56.
446. Among the associations that advocate recreational boating safety are the Na-
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ripe for a federal, statutorily-created cause of action for marine
products liability to preempt state law and foster uniformity.447 As
demonstrated by the contradictory results is Sherman and Reliance Insurance Co., there is a potential for decisional inconsistency. Between
the interests of commercial shipping (the traditional heart of admiralty law) and consumer advocates, whose interests will prevail? The
inconsistency extends even further than the issue of the availability
of economic damages in tort. Presently, comprehensive consumer
warranty protections for recreational vessel defects causing only economic losses are already inherent in both federal 448 and state statutes. 449 Yet, along with commercial vessel owners, recreational buyers
can avail themselves of other unique admiralty protections, such as
limitation of liability actions to avoid or limit negligence. 45o By with-

447.

448.

449.

450.

tional Safe Boating Council, United States Coast Guard Auxiliary, and United
States Power Squadrons, Inc. See Russell & Nikas, supra note 104, at 383 ("In
response to growing concern regarding the safety of recreational vessels, representatives of insurance trade organizations and companies, including the
National Association of State Boating Law Administrators, the National Safety
Council, and the National Transportation Safety Board formed the National
Recreational Boating Safety Coalition.") (citing New Coalition Seeks to Reduce
Recreational Boating Casualties, MARINE SAFE1Y REp., Oct. 2, 1995, at 2). The purpose of the Recreational Boating Safety Coalition is to "increase public awareness of boating safety problems and refine data collection of boating accidents, to better identify trends and possible areas for improvement." Id.
See Jeffrey White, Does Products Bill Collide with the Tenth Amendment?, TRIAL,
Nov. 1997, at 30 & n.8 (explaining that Congress did not create a federal
cause of action for products liability in the Product Liability Reform Act of
1997, but noting that it has previously introduced such a federal cause of action in other proposed and unenacted federal legislation). But see Stolz, supra
note 436, at 719 (arguing that "the law of pleasure boating will develop faster
and more rationally if the creative capacities of the state courts and legislatures are freed of an imaginary federal concern with anything that floats on
navigable waters").
See Boatel Indus. v. Hester, 77 Md. App. 284, 305, 550 A.2d 389, 400 (1988); see
also 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (1988) (Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act). As explained
by 16 C.F.R. § 700.1 (1988), the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland concluded that the appellee's boat fell under the broad reach of the MagnusonMoss Act. See Boate~ 77 Md. App. at 305, 550 A.2d at 400.
See Boatel, 77 Md. App. at 299-305, 550 A.2d at 397-99 (discussing MD. CODE
ANN., COMM. LAw I § 9-109(1) (1995); MD. CODE ANN., COMM. LAw II § 13-101
(1990 & Supp. 1998); MD. CODE ANN., COMM. LAw II § 14-101(d) (1990 &
Supp. 1998». Under the specific facts of this case, the court held that these
sections were not applicable. See id. at 302-05, 550 A.2d at 398-99.
See Complaint of Dillahey, 733 F. Supp. 874, 879 (D. NJ. 1990) (discussing the
application of 46 U.S.C. App. § 183 to recreational vessels). Limitation is an
admiralty device that allows judicial proceedings to limit liability to the after-
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holding one type of protection while extending another based on
consumer pressures, the courts could generate decisions that are
counterintuitive to admiralty's consistency and uniformity
principles. 451
Until the enactment of a federal statute or a complete change
in the course charted by the Supreme Court, the state courts, in-<
cluding those of Maryland, must adhere to the principles and tenets
of the substantive general maritime law. If a Maryland court could
not provide an admiralty based remedy for economic losses, but the
state law would, the Maryland courts should not be tempted to do
so. With its long and distinguished history of admiralty practice in
its courts,452 Maryland should not depart from the traditional notions of uniformity and consistency in admiralty in favor of a consumerist's view.
Imagine if you will, a hypothetical case that stems from the total loss of a yacht, similar to the circumstances in Sherman. 453 Assume these facts: (1) there was no personal injury and minimal
"other property" losses sustained in the boat's sinking, (2) the recreational vessel was valued at less than the federal jurisdictional
amount, and (3) it was manufactured by a Maryland corporation
and sold by a Maryland dealer. Assume further that the suit, in
which the plaintiffs allege that the boat was defective, was filed in
one of Maryland's circuit courts, and the lack of any reason to extend federal jurisdiction precluded removal. Which economic loss
principle, the harsher federal rule barring recovery absent personal
injury or other property losses or Maryland's balancing-of-harm
rule, should govern?
Observing the erosion of uniformity signaled by some Supreme
Court's454 precedent,455 as well as the Green and Sherman court's decisions,456 the Maryland court could arguably allow a recovery under
the economic loss rule fashioned by its own appellate courts. 457 In

451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.

accident value of the vessel or even exonerate the boat owner from any liability under certain conditions. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, §§ 13-1 to 13-2 &
761 n.8.
But see Stanton v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 866 P.2d 15, 22 (Wash. 1993) (declining to depart from admiralty'S uniformity principles).
See generally OWEN & TOLLEY. supra note 45, at 7-11.
See supra Part VII.A.
See Thompson, supra note 17, at 224.
See supra notes 337-356, 414-23 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 374.
See supra Part III.C.
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contrast, the federal scheme, whether by preemption or uniformity,
barring a tort recovery seemingly propagates an unnecessarily severe
result, especially in view of safety at sea concerns. Nevertheless,
should this situation ever present itself in a Maryland state court,
that court must look beyond the borders of its own state and the
boundaries of its own jurisprudence to guide its result. 458
IX. CONCLUSION
Maryland is abundantly blessed with the Chesapeake Bay and
its seacoast. The recreational boating population attracted to its
beauty, however, can significantly pressure Maryland's legal community to find solutions that are seemingly more equitable to a recreational vessel consumer's economic losses when measured against the
harsher remedies available in admiralty.459 While the commercial
maritime vessel operator and the recreational boater-consumer are
factually distinguishable in many aspects,460 uniformity should preclude any legal distinction in a marine products liability action even
if state law grounds are advanced. 461
The owner whose pleasure boat was lost due to failure of a defective marine product may not care about uniformity principles of
admiralty in favor of finding a remedy for the purely economic loss
suffered. 462 However, those very same admiralty principles gave rise
to the insurance that may well have afforded protection for that
loss.463 The legal concern lies, nonetheless, not with the choice of
law available in a federal forum or a state court,464 but with the
patchwork of differing law and available remedies in different jurisdictions. 465 Clearly, this offends the long tradition of uniformity in
admiralty jurisprudence. 466
Michael R Vitt
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